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The Selective Deportation of Same-Gender*
Partners: In Search of the "Rara Avis"
VICTOR

I.

A

C.

ROMERO**

THOUGHT EXPERIMENT: THE SELECTIVE DEPORTATION OF
FOREIGN SAME-GENDER PARTNER OVERSTAYS

In Adams v. Howerton,I the Ninth Circuit adjudicated an issue that
may become an important civil rights concern during this millennium: Is
it constitutional for Congress to deny immigration benefits to the foreign
same-gender partner of a United States citizen? The panel upheld the
constitutionality of interpreting Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
section 201(b), which permits immigration based on certain familial
relationships, to limit the conferral of "immediate relative" status to
those noncitizen "spouses" involved in a heterosexual, but not homosexual, marriage.2 While the statute placed no such explicit limitation on
the term "spouse," 3 the court ruled that the INS's implementation decision to limit immigration benefits to heterosexual couples was constitu* Like some other commentators, I am persuaded that "same-gender" is preferable to the
oft-used term "same-sex" because substituting "sex" for "gender" creates more ambiguity and
imprecision. First, the law of equal protection refers to "gender-based" not "sex-based"
classification. And second, the term "sex" places undue emphasis on the sexual nature of a samegender couple's relationship, which, while important, is certainly not paramount. See, e.g.,
Christopher S. Hargis, Queer Reasoning: Immigration Policy, Baker v. State of Vermont, and the
(Non)recognition of Same-Gender Relationships, 10 LAW & SEXUALITY 211, 211 n.2 (2001).
** Professor of Law, The Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of Law. E-mail:
<VCRI @PSU.EDU>. My thinking on these issues has been sharpened by fruitful conversations
with many of my law school colleagues at Penn State-Dickinson. I have also received important
feedback and input from Chris Nugent of the American Bar Association, Gail Pendleton of the
National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, and Pradeep Singla of the Lesbian
and Gay Immigration Rights Task Force. Many special thanks to Kevin Johnson and Jay Mootz
for their thoughtful comments on a prior draft; Gwenn McCollum for her invaluable research
assistance; Dean Peter Glenn for his generous funding of this piece; and most of all, my wife,
Corie, and my son, Ryan, as well as my family in the Philippines for their constant love and
support of this and many other projects. All errors that remain are mine alone.
1. 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982).
2. Section 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § I151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2001), provides that " . . the immediate
relatives means the children, spouses, and parents of a citizen of the United States, except that in
the case of parents, such citizens shall be at least 21 years of age." The immediate relatives
specified in this subsection who are otherwise qualified for admission shall be admitted as such,
without regard to the numerical limitations in this chapter. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (2001).
3. In the other code section containing the term, "spouse" appears alongside "wife" and
"husband," but is itself not limited to a heterosexual relationship. See 8 U.S.C. § I101(a)(35)
(2001) (stating that "spouse" does not include "a spouse, wife, or husband by reason of any
marriage ceremony where the contracting parties thereto are not physically present in the presence
of each other, unless the marriage shall have been consummated").
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tionally rational.4 Despite the plaintiffs' attempts to have the relevant
provisions more strictly scrutinized, the court cited Congress's wellestablished plenary power over the field, which mandated a much more
perfunctory review of the contested legislation.5 Nonetheless, the Ninth
Circuit noted that there might be limits to Congress's plenary power
over immigration:
The scope of this very limited judicial review has not been further
defined; the Supreme Court has not determined what limitations, if
any, the Constitution imposes upon Congress. Faced with numerous
challenges to laws governing the exclusion of aliens and the expulsion of resident and non-resident aliens, the Court has consistently
reaffirmed the power of Congress to legislate in this area.6

In the almost twenty years since the Adams decision, the United
States has witnessed a growing tolerance for homosexuality, both within
immigration law7 and among the public generally.8 Notably, last year,
Vermont decided to formally recognize same-gender civil unions, leading to the "marriage" of over 3,000 individuals, seventy-eight percent of
whom are from other states, Washington, D.C., or other countries. 9 But
4. Adams, 673 F.2d at 1042 ("We hold that section 201(b) of the [Immigration and
Nationality] Act is not unconstitutional because it denies the preferences accorded to spouses of
heterosexual marriages.").
5. Id. at 1041 ("Congress has almost plenary power to admit or exclude aliens, and the
decisions of Congress are subject only to limited judicial review.") (internal citations omitted).
6. Id. at 1042.
7. Part of the case arguably rested on an outdated Supreme Court decision, Boutilier v. INS,
387 U.S. 118 (1967), which upheld the constitutionality of an immigration exclusion ground based
on the psychopathology of homosexuality. This exclusion ground was repealed in 1990. See
Denise C. Hammond, Immigration and Sexual Orientation:Developing Standards, Options, and
Obstacles, 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 113, 116-17 (2000).
8. Justice Stevens noted this attitudinal change in his Dale dissent:
Unfavorable opinions about homosexuals "have ancient roots." Like equally
atavistic opinions about certain racial groups, those roots have been nourished by
sectarian doctrine. Over the years, however, interaction with real people, rather than
mere adherence to traditional ways of thinking about members of unfamiliar classes,
have modified those opinions. A few examples: The American Psychiatric
Association's and the American Psychological Association's removal of
"homosexuality" from their lists of mental disorders; a move toward greater
understanding within some religious communities; Justice Blackmun's classic
opinion in Bowers; Georgia's invalidation of the statute upheld in Bowers; and
New Jersey's enactment of the provision [prohibiting sexual orientation
discrimination] at issue in this case.
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 669 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal citations
omitted). Despite this trend, polls by the Los Angeles Times in 2000 (38% approval rate versus
40% disapproval rate) and by USA Today in 1993 (46% in favor versus 48% opposed) reveal that
most Americans still disfavor according civil rights to homosexuals. Poll, available at http://poll.
orspub.com/poll/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm (last visited July 18, 2001) (copies on file
with the author).
9. Report of the Vermont Civil Union Review Commission, Finding 2 (Jan. 2001), available
at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/baker/cureport.htm (last visited May 23, 2001). The foreign
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despite calls by some to overturn Adams,"° no judicial intervention
appears forthcoming, partly because of Congress's plenary power over
immigration, and partly due to the 1996 passage of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which limits the definition of "marriage" to heterosexual unions for federal purposes and permits states not to recognize

same-gender unions from other jurisdictions." Since Adams, the plenary power doctrine and DOMA have combined to create a formidable
barrier to any judicial recognition of binational same-gender marriage,
gay rights groups have therefore sought to lobby Congress for ways
around Adams. These efforts include the recently introduced Permanent
Partners Immigration Act of 2001, which seeks to create immigration
benefits for same-gender partners while leaving the INA definition of

"spouse" intact.12

Despite these efforts, the recent appearance of Vermont as a haven
for same-gender couples - including binational ones - prompts consideration of a different question than that addressed in Adams: Would it be
constitutional for the INS to choose to deport the foreign same-gender

partner overstay of a United States citizen civilly united in Vermont
solely because of her sexual orientation? While Adams focused on the

constitutionality of denying immigration benefits to same-gender partners, this inquiry does not challenge any Congressional action; it asks
only whether the INS has the power under the Constitution to selectively
deport someone based solely on her sexual orientation.

The following scenario might provide a useful focal point for this
discussion. Mexican national Maria Camacho is a foreign student at the
University of Vermont. 13 In her junior year, Maria falls in love with

classmate Susan Sanders, a United States citizen. Their relationship
grows and the couple decides to celebrate their love by entering into a

same-gender civil union under Vermont law after graduation. Realizing
that Maria's foreign student visa is about to expire,' 4 Susan applies with
countries represented were Canada, England, Venezuela, Mexico, Philippines, Australia,
Netherlands, Germany, India, and Guatemala. Id. For a survey of the leading cases discussing
same-gender union laws, see Robert E. Rains, The Evolving Status of Same-Sex Unions in Hawaii,
Alaska, Vermont and Throughout the United States, 2000 CoNTEMP. ISSUES IN LAW 71 (2000).
10. See, e.g., Hammond, supra note 7, at 116-17; Hargis, supra note *, at 234-36.
11. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at I U.S.C. § 7). On DOMA, see
generally Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of Marriage Act is
Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1997).
12. See Permanent Partners Immigration Act of 2001, CIS Bill Tracking Report, 107 H.R.
690 (introduced Feb. 14, 2001).
13. The choice to depict the hypothetical noncitizen as a woman is based on statistical reality.
As of December 29, 2000, sixty-five percent of the same-gender unions performed in Vermont
were between women. See Report, supra note 9, at Finding 2.
14. Typically, foreign students carry the F-I visa which allows them to stay for the
completion of a course of study. See INA § 101(a)(15)(F), 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(15)(F) (2001).
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the INS to adjust Maria's status from nonimmigrant to immigrant on the
basis of their Vermont civil union. 15 The INS demurs, noting that current federal law 16 and relevant case precedent 17 do not confer immigration benefits upon noncitizen same-gender partners. Despite the rebuff,
Maria decides to thwart the federal law and sets up to live permanently
in Vermont with Susan. She therefore lets her visa expire, reasoning
that at least Vermont recognizes that she and Susan have a valid union
and she does not believe that the INS would seek to deport her. As more
and more same-gender mixed immigration-status couples begin to flock
to Vermont, civilly unite, and then thwart the immigration law, 18 however, the INS is left with no choice but to begin deporting Maria and
others like her.
While the foregoing story may strike some readers as a most
improbable scenario, the narrative appears more credible when viewed
from the lens of two recent Supreme Court decisions - Reno v. American-Arab Anti-DiscriminationCommittee "9and Boy Scouts of America
v. Dale2" - that curtail the rights of immigrants and homosexuals,
respectively. In AADC,21 in a scenario not unlike the one described
above, the INS singled out for deportation six nonimmigrants and two
permanent residents because of their membership in the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), believed by the government to be
an international terrorist organization.2 2 Though accused of no crimes,
the "LA 8 " 23 were guilty of terrorism by association; as then-FBI Direc15. See generally INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2001) (general adjustment of status
provision).
16. See DOMA, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at I U.S.C. § 7)
(limiting definition of marriage to heterosexual unions for purposes of federal benefits); INA
§ 101(a)(35), 8 U.S.C. § I101(a)(35) (2001) (including only the terms "spouse," wife," and
"husband," but not providing for "same-gender partner").
17. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982). See supra text accompanying notes
3-8.
18. E-mail from Pradeep Singla, Lesbian and Gay Immigration Rights Task Force, to Victor
C. Romero, Penn State-Dickinson School of Law (May 18, 2001) (on file with author). Singla
states:
We receive a large number of phone calls/emails from binational same-sex couples
who are struggling with U.S. immigration law. Indeed, one of the most frequently
asked questions pertains to entering into a civil union in Vermont and seeking
recognition of this relationship by INS for immigration benefits. Also, many sexual
orientation-based asylum seekers have U.S. citizen partners.
19. 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
20. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
21. 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
22. Id. at 473.
23. For a thorough discussion of this case and other issues involving the targeting of so-called

"terrorists" because of their political affiliations, see
& THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL
33-46 (1999) (describing the "LA 8" case).

TERRORISM
SECURITY

JAMES

X.

DEMPSEY

&

DAVID COLE,

LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL
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tor William Webster admitted, "If these individuals had been United
24
States citizens, there would not have been a basis for their arrest."
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the deportees alleged that they
had been selectively targeted by the INS in violation of their First
Amendment right to join the PFLP
The Court chose to address their
constitutional claim only in dicta, ruling instead on statutory grounds.
Nonetheless, Justice Scalia's majority opinion used strikingly broad language in addressing the constitutional issue: "As a general matter-and
assuredly in the context of claims such as those put forward in the present case-an alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right
to assert selective enforcement as a defense against his deportation."2 6
After supporting this statement, he went on to qualify: "To resolve the
present controversy, we need not rule out the possibility of a rare case in
which the alleged basis of discrimination is so outrageous that the foregoing considerations can be overcome. '"27
The difference between deporting noncitizen overstays who are terrorist affiliates, on the one hand, and those who are same-gender partners, on the other, might strike some as so glaring that the analogy is
unconvincing. 28 The line between the non-criminal terrorist affiliate and
the non-criminal same-gender partner, however, might not be particularly obvious to some. Both types of overstays might be viewed as
being engaged in intimate relationships with undesirables - terrorists in
one instance, gays or lesbians in another, and their "illegal" immigration
status provides the government with a good reason to deport them.
Indeed, former INS Commissioner Doris Meissner's November 2000
memorandum on prosecutorial discretion recounts that the agency prosecutes immigration violations to further several goals, including "protecting public safety,29 promoting the integrity of the legal immigration
24. Id. at 35.
25. AADC, 525 U.S. at 472.
26. Id. at 488.

27. Id. at 491.
28. As one colleague put it:
[W]ould the feds really implement a homophobic policy under these conditions?
Who would care - the dissenting citizens of Vermont who are trying to avoid
having the state be a port of entry for gay non-citizens? My initial reaction would
be that there would be no specific targeting by the feds without some push, and I
don't see the motivation. Am I too naive?
E-mail from Francis J. Mootz, III, to Victor C. Romero, Penn State-Dickinson School of Law
(May 21, 2001) (on file with author).
29. The protection of the heterosexual public from homosexuals is a resonant theme in
American legal history both within and outside immigration law. See generally William N.
Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse and the Channeling
Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1328-29 (2000). Eskridge stated:

Antigay discourse has shifted in the last generation. For most of the twentieth
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system, and deterring violations of the immigration law." 3 Just as the
deportation of overstaying terrorist affiliates might arguably promote all

three goals, in some people's minds the removal of same-gender partner
overstays would be similarly effective. Analogously, DOMA was probably enacted in part because of the perceived threat that there would be a

great increase in the number of jurisdictions that might recognize samegender unions.
While it is true that Commissioner Meissner's memorandum
explicitly leaves the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to the hands of
high-level INS officials,3 should there be a sizeable number of cases
that emerge in future years not only out of Vermont, but from other
states that seek to pass similar legislation, 32 there might be an impetus to
begin deporting same-gender partner overstays. This is especially true if
one holds the view that, morally, such persons are not much different

from the "LA 8" and that, irregardless, the continued violation of the
immigration laws should be stopped through their removal.
While the day of homosexual removals en masse is not upon us, the
specific targeting of homosexuals over the last fifteen years highlighted
in recent Supreme Court decisions - for sodomy law violations, 33 to
prevent homosexuals from enacting protective state legislation, 34 and to
exclude them from private leadership positions in organizations 35 - sug-

century, laws or social norms stigmatizing gay people were justified on the ground
that gay people do disgusting things or are diseased or predatory. Intolerance of bad
people and their bad acts was the rationale. Since the 1960s, these justifications
have been supplemented with arguments that progay changes in law or norms would
encourage homosexuality or homosexual conduct. The slogan is "no promotion of
homosexuality." In slang, no promo homo.
See also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 3536, 69-70, 132-34, 383-84 (1999) (discussing the exclusion of homosexuals under United States
immigration law).
30. Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization
Service, to INS Regional Directors et al., at 4 (Nov. 17, 2000), available at http://www.ins.usdoj.
gov/graphisslawregs/handbook/discreton.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2002).
31. Id. at 5 ("Except as may be provided specifically in other policy statements or directives,
the responsibility for exercising prosecutorial discretion in the manner rests with the District
Director (DD) or Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) based on his or her common sense and sound
judgment.").
32. Until 1999, Hawaii recognized same-gender marriages pursuant to the state supreme
court's decision in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). However, a state constitutional
amendment limiting marriage to heterosexuals was approved by Hawaii's voters in 1998,
prompting the court to dismiss the suit. See David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawaii Marriage
Amendment: Its Origins, Meaning and Fate, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 19 (2000). Indeed, even the socalled conservative majority of the Supreme Court recently noted that "it appears that
homosexuality has gained greater societal acceptance." Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S.
640, 660 (2000). See also supra note 8 (describing greater acceptance of gays over time).
33. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
34. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
35. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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gests that the selective immigration prosecution of homosexuals might
not be so farfetched.3 6 Indeed, Supreme Court opinions on the immigration exclusion of certain select groups, specifically on racial37 and ideological 38 grounds, is a well-established source for affirming

Congressional plenary power over the field.3 9 Thus, the specific targeting of same-gender partner overstays captures anti-gay and anti-immigrant sentiment that has long been a part of Supreme Court history, both
ancient and recent.
Thinking back to the Camacho-Sanders hypothetical, does the mass

deportation of overstaying same-gender partners constitute an outrageous "rara avis" under AADC 4 0 or does it constitute a permissible
enforcement of immigration law, not unlike the removal of terrorist-

sympathizers such as the "LA 8"? Part of the answer to this question
might depend on how the Court views not only immigrants in general,
but homosexual immigrants in specific. To this end, a review of the
second important case, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,4 might be
useful.
In Dale, the Court held that New Jersey's Law Against Discrimina36. One could argue that certain homosexual noncitizens should be deported before the "LA
8" terrorist affiliates where such homosexuals are also criminals under state sodomy statutes.
Reviewing the Meissner "prosecutorial discretion" memorandum, it appears that the removal of
criminal noncitizens is a high priority for the INS. See Meissner Memo, supra note 30, at 6 n.6.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, the INS could conceivably seek
to remove all homosexuals convicted of sodomy statutes based on their commission of a "moral
turpitude" crime, a deportable offense. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196 (upholding sodomy
statutes against due process claim); INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (West
Supp. 2001) (noting that conviction of "moral turpitude" crime is a deportable offense). To be
fair, former Commissioner Meissner also notes that "[e]ven an operation that is designed based on
high-priority criteria, however, may still identify individual aliens who warrant a favorable
exercise of prosecutorial discretion." Meissner Memo, supra note 30, at 6.
37. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States; 130 U.S. 381 (1889); Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). For a thorough discussion of the racial implications of these
cases, see Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the
Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1998). Professor Kevin Johnson has
argued that the racial discrimination in immigration law mirrors the same discrimination evident
in other domestic law. See Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race
Relations: A "Magic Mirror" into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111 (1998).
38. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnesy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206
(1953). See also Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons from
the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1995).
39. For a recent examination of the Supreme Court's major plenary power cases from Chae
Chan Ping through AADC, see Victor C. Romero, On Elidn andAliens: A Political Solution to the
Plenary Power Doctrine, 4 NYU J.LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 343, 348-62 (2000) (hereinafter Romero,
On Elidn].
40. Elsewhere in the opinion, Justice Scalia noted that even in the criminal law field, the

selective prosecution claim was a "rara avis." Reno v. AADC, 525 U.S. 471, 489 (1999).
41. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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tion did not compel the Boy Scouts to retain a homosexual assistant
scoutmaster.4 2 Despite the New Jersey statute's specific bar against sexual orientation discrimination,4 3 the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right
to expressive association trumped the state's interest in protecting homosexuals. As a private entity, the Boy Scouts was free to deny a leadership position to a practicing homosexual because to do otherwise would
"at the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to the
youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual
conduct as a legitimate form of behavior. '' " The majority cautiously
chose not to endorse the Boy Scouts' anti-homosexual message: "We are
not, as we must not be, guided by our views of whether the Boy Scouts'
teachings with respect to homosexual conduct are right or wrong .... "'I
While not an immigrants' rights case like AADC, Dale is the
Supreme Court's latest statement on the equally contested issue of gay
rights. Indeed, five of the six" justices who signed on to the AADC
majority opinion - Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and O'Connor
- were the same five who sided with the Boy Scouts in Dale. Taking
AADC and Dale together, one might think that Ms. Camacho and Ms.
Sanders in the opening hypothetical would receive little support from
these five justices. After all, if these five justices are not likely to sympathize with either deportable noncitizens (as in AADC) or homosexuals
(as in Dale), how likely is it that they would side with Maria Camacho, a
deportable, homosexual, noncitizen?
As mentioned earlier, conventional wisdom might suggest that Ms.
Camacho and Ms. Sanders should seek relief from Congress by having it
amend the immigration code to allow for same-gender sponsorship.47
To the extent that immigration and naturalization are the province of the
federal government, any relief for same-gender partners must be sought
in the halls of Congress, not in the courts, so the argument goes. This is
a powerful argument, and indeed, one which the author has recently
made himself.4 8 Indeed, it is an especially useful argument considering
42. Id. at 659.
43. N.J. STAT.

ANN. §§ 10:5-4 - 10:5-5 (West Supp. 2000).
44. Dale, 530 U.S. at 653.
45. Id. 661.
46. Justice Stevens did not join the majority opinion, but filed a concurrence agreeing with
Scalia's constitutional "outrageous" test in AADC. See AADC, 525 U.S. at 501 (Stevens, J.,

concurring).
47. See supra text accompanying note 12.
48. See generally Romero, On Elidn, supra note 39, at 345 n.16 ("Many of the [author's]
prior pieces advocate changes in the way the judiciary protects immigrants' rights, whereas this

Article looks to the political branches of government for effective policy reform.").
In February 2001, Representative Jerrold Nadler of New York introduced the Permanent
Partners Immigration Act of 2001, which aims to confer immigration benefits for foreign partners
in same-gender relationships with United States citizens. See CIS Bill Tracking Report, H.R. 690,
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that this deportation scenario is fictional. Having the law changed to

same-gender partners would render the
allow immigration benefits for
49
foregoing hypothetical moot.
This article, however, will take a different path. Even though there
have been no reported cases of selective deportations based on sexual
orientation, AADC and Dale make exploration of the Camacho-Sanders
hypothetical worth while. The modest goal of this article is to wage a
preemptive strike: By examining the possibility that such selective

deportations might occur in this context, the hope is that advocates of
putative deportees would have a litigation resource or, better still, that
the INS never adopt such a policy at all.

Thus, Part II explores the contours of the majority's statement5" in
AADC and takes seriously the opening story to suggest that Ms. Camacho has a strong constitutional argument not to be selectively deported
because of her homosexual status, despite the apparently anti-homosexual pronouncements in Dale. A review of its noncitizen and gay rights
jurisprudence reveals that, despite its deference to the political branches
under most circumstances, the Court will not hesitate to strike down
legislative or executive action in cases of extreme discriminatory treatment. Whether the vehicle for such judicial intervention is called "equal
107 Bill Tracking H.R. 690. While many in the immigration law field believe that a legislative
solution such as H.R. 690 would be preferable to a judicial one, even this law's advocates believe
that, at best, H.R. 690 will serve only as a useful springboard for discussion of this issue, but will
not pass in the current Congress. See E-mail from Gail Pendleton, National Immigration Project
of the National Lawyers Guild, to Victor C. Romero, Penn State-Dickinson School of Law (May
17, 2001) (on file with author). Pendelton states:
Under immigration law, INS recognizes marriages if they are valid in the
jurisdiction in which they took place BUT not if there's an overriding public policy
concern. I think the general consensus is that there are only two ways to fix this get rid of [the Defense of Marriage Act] or explicitly recognize in the INA itself that
partnerships are bases for immigrating. Rep. Jerry Nadler has introduced such a bill
which should serve as leverage for discussing the issue, even if the likelihood of its
passage is slim under current political conditions.
(emphasis in original).
49. On the other hand, Angela Kelley, Deputy Director of the National Immigration Forum,
believes that it is highly unlikely that any major pro-immigrant reform coming out of the nowDemocratic Senate will be approved by President Bush. See Immigration Impact of Sen.
Jeffords's Party Switch Under Debate as Leadership Changes Hands, 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES
921, 922 (2001) ("While the Bush administration is likely to oppose many [pro-immigrant]
measures, spelling ultimate defeat, Senators will nonetheless be forced to go on records with their
pro- or anti-immigration views, Ms. Kelley said, and that record may be increasingly important as
the 2004 presidential election approaches.").
50. Whether Part III of Justice Scalia's opinion is dictum is the subject of debate. Compare
Reno v. AADC, 525 U.S. 471, 510 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing opinion as dicta)
with David A. Martin, On CounterintuitiveConsequences and Choosing the Right Control Group:
A Defense of Reno v. AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 363, 383 (2000) ("The Supreme Court in
AADC intended categorically to bar selective enforcement as an in limine defense to deportation,
absent a claim of undefined outrageous misconduct by INS. This ruling is not dictum ....").
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protection" or "due process," the result is that, even on a conservative
Court such as the present one, there will likely be five votes in favor of
the individual rights claimant, despite her being a gay noncitizen. Thus,
the "outrageous" test articulated by Scalia in AADC is but another version of a "minimal protection" test. Under this scheme, the Court will
strike down legislative or executive action only if two things are present:
(1) it views the plaintiff as a having been unfairly deprived of a right
open to all, and who asks only for "equal," as opposed to "special,"
treatment; and (2) it can identify no legitimate governmental interest to
preserve majority sentiment, expressed either through legislative policy,
executive action, or a core constitutional value. Although there are doctrinal arguments to suggest otherwise, on balance, a majority of the
Court should find that the selective deportation based on sexual orientation offends common notions of decency and justice, thereby rendering
such an act "outrageous."
Part III concludes with a brief revisit to Adams, placing the samegender immigration benefits debate within a larger international context
and arguing that sooner or later, the United States government will have
to address the larger issue of same-gender partnerships and their inferior
status vis-A-vis traditional, heterosexual marriages.
II.

WHAT CONSTITUTES "OUTRAGEOUS"?:

A REVIEW OF RECENT

CASES ON GAY AND IMMIGRANTS'

RIGHTS

In drafting this article, I have shared the hypothetical about mass
deportations of foreign same-gender partner overstays with many people, both lawyers and non-lawyers, to test its relevance and to examine
gut reactions to the story. Most believe that the INS would never engage
in such an act because they would have no particular incentive to do so,
despite the overstays' continued unlawful presence. Underlying this
argument, I suspect, is a belief that such a scenario would be ludicrous that it would be un-American to deport homosexual overstays just
because we could, especially if they were part of a legal same-gender
union under state law. However, when asked to indulge my paranoia
and consider the hypothetical at face value, the same people assume that
most United States residents would affirm the INS's decision, even if the
deportees were selectively targeted because of their homosexuality, on
two related grounds: first, that the federal government has virtually
unlimited power over immigration matters; and second, that the real
issue is the noncitizen's "illegal" status, and not her sexual orientation.
Ms. Camacho's sexual orientation should not excuse her violation of a
valid law.
From this admittedly most unscientific of surveys, I detect a dis-
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connect. Although, many believe that the selective deportation of foreign same-gender partner overstays would be highly unlikely, there is
also consensus that the federal government would have the power to
carry out such a directive.
It is this disconnect that I plan to explore in the context of the following statement from AADC: "To resolve this present controversy, we
need not rule out the possibility of a rare case in which the alleged basis
of discrimination is so outrageous that the foregoing considerations can
be overcome."'" If, in a sense, the opening narrative is "outrageous"
because it offends our idea of how America treats visitors within its
boundaries, why is it no less "outrageous" should the government actually carry out this scenario? Put differently, if the thought of deporting
same-gender partner overstays en masse offends our sensibilities, why
would the Supreme Court approve such a project?
A.

Reno v. AADC: What Is "Outrageous" Conduct?5 2

In Reno v. AADC, the Supreme Court stated that, generally, noncitizens could not assert a First Amendment selective prosecution claim to
challenge their otherwise valid deportation order.5 3 In AADC, the INS
sought to deport eight noncitizens (two of whom were permanent
residents) because of their affiliation with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which the government described as a terrorist organization. 4
In the convoluted lower court litigation, the government contended
that while the First Amendment would protect the rights of United States
citizens to affiliate with groups such as the PFLP, the same protection
does not extend to noncitizens. As then-FBI Director William Webster
admitted, "If these individuals had been United States citizens there
would not have been a basis for their arrest." Several variations of this
argument were presented in the federal district and appeals courts, but
the courts soundly rejected them each time. The lower courts agreed
with the noncitizens that the First Amendment required that they not be
selectively targeted for deportation solely because of their political
affiliations.55
The Justice Department pursued an appeal to the Supreme Court,
which resolved the First Amendment issues in its opinion although it
51. AADC, 525 U.S. at 491.
52. The following narrative of AADC is taken in large part from the same case description in

a prior writing. See Romero, On Elidn, supra note 39, at 359-60.
53. AADC, 525 U.S. at 491-92.
54. Id. at 473.
55. See DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 23, at 35, 39-41.
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initially declined to do so because the parties left them unbriefed.
Despite the fact that the case was resolved on statutory grounds, the
Court nonetheless opined on the selective prosecution argument. It
sided with the government and noted that the First Amendment typically
did not prevent the INS from choosing whom to deport among noncitizens illegally present: "[A]n alien unlawfully in this country has no
constitutional right to assert selective enforcement as a defense against
his deportation. 5 6 Writing for the majority, Scalia reasoned that
allowing such claims would unnecessarily hamper the operations of the
executive branch as it seeks merely to enforce the immigration rules set
by Congress:
Even when deportation is sought because of some act the alien has
committed, in principle the alien is not being punished for that act
(criminal charges may be available for that separate purpose) but is
merely being held to the terms under which he was admitted. And in
all cases, deportation is necessary in order to bring to an end an ongoing violation of United States law. The contention that a violation
must be allowed to continue because it has been improperly selected
is not powerfully appealing.5 7
Without specifying a concrete example, the Court did note, however, that there may be rare cases in which the alleged basis of discrimination is so outrageous that the balance tips in the noncitizen's favor:
"To resolve the present controversy, we need not rule out the possibility
of the rare case in which the alleged basis of discrimination is so outrageous that the foregoing considerations can be overcome." 8
Scalia noted that selective enforcement claims are generally disfavored in the criminal context and should be even further discouraged in
deportation proceedings for at least three reasons. First, allowing the
full adjudication of all selective deportation claims will lead to delays,
which allow the deportee to continue to remain in the United States in
violation of the law.5 9 Second, greater scrutiny of INS action will chill
law enforcement by leading to the disclosure of sensitive foreign-policy
56. AADC, 525 U.S. at 488.
57. Id. at 491.

58. Id.
59. Id. at 490. But see David A. Martin, On CounterintuitiveConsequences and Choosing the
Right Control Group: A Defense of Reno v. AADC, 14 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 363, 365 (2000).

Martin stated:
I agree with [Professor Neuman] that LPRs [legal permanent residents] are not
engaged in continuing violations simply because they have ostensibly committed an
act that could give rise to deportability. Hence in the case of an LPR, the concept of
continuing violation does not fit. Neuman could strengthen the point by discussing

the administrative practice applying the INA's own definition of "lawfully admitted
for permanent residence." Under that and other INS practice one remains lawfully
admitted for permanent residence until a final administrative determination that
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objectives.6" And third, unlike in criminal prosecutions, deportations
seek only to hold the noncitizens to the terms of their admission; deportation is not punishment, and hence,
constitutional safeguards may prop61

erly be relaxed in this context.
Although the Court's justices voted eight to one in favor of upholding the INS's deportation decision on statutory grounds (even if for dif-

ferent reasons), they were split on the proper constitutional analysis.
Five of the justices - Rehnquist, Thomas, O'Connor, Kennedy, and, in a
separate opinion, Stevens - subscribed to Scalia's notion that, absent
outrageous government conduct, noncitizens were barred from raising
selective enforcement as a constitutional defense to deportation. Two
others - Ginsburg and Souter - set forth separate opinions which
expressed a greater willingness to consider selective deportation claims.
Breyer was the only one not to express his view on the constitutional
availability of selective deportation claims.6 2
To summarize, the justices were split six to two in favor of the
general bar, with one abstention. Despite the fact that Scalia's analysis

has not been developed further in subsequent cases and is arguably dictum, 63 a solid majority of the Court accepts Scalia's test, even though
two - Ginsburg and Souter - might prefer stronger judicial review of
selective deportation claims. It is worth exploring, therefore, how our
same-gender partner overstay might fare under such a test.
For someone who usually takes care to only address issues squarely
before the Court, Justice Scalia's selective deportation discussion not
only was unnecessary to the resolution of the case, but was also an issue
changes the status; the mere existence of antecedent facts upon which such a
determination might rest works no change itself.
60. AADC, 525 U.S. at 491.

61. Id.
62. Justice Breyer filed no opinion in AADC, limiting his involvement to joining Ginsburg's
statutory analysis, but not her thoughts on selective deportation. Nonetheless, Breyer showed a
firm rejection of stereotypes albeit in the gender-context, in Miller:
Since either men or women may be caretakers, and since either men or women may
be "breadwinners," one could justify the gender distinction only on the ground that
more women are caretakers than men, and more men are 'breadwinners' than
women. This, again, is the kind of generalization that we have rejected as justifying
a gender-based distinction in other cases.
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 488 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer and his pro-gay
rights positions in Evans and Dale suggest that he might still rule against the selective deportation
of a same-gender partner, unless he views the rights asserted in that context to be more about
immigration and less about the protection of homosexuals. See infra Part II(C)(l).
63. AADC, 525 U.S. at 510 (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing Scalia's test as "dictum"). But
see Martin, supra note 50, at 383 ("The Supreme Court in AADC intended categorically to bar
selective enforcement as an in limine defense to deportation, absent a claim of undefined
'outrageous' misconduct by INS. This ruling is not dictum ....
).
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the parties did not brief. 64 That he would go out of his way to rule on
this issue suggests that the types of claims he might consider "outrageous" might be limited, indeed.6 5 Justice Stevens's opinion supports
the idea of a limited exception, further distinguishing between punishment in the criminal justice context and the less adverse consequences of
deportation. Stevens asserted that while Congress could not punish
innocent persons because of their membership in a terrorist organization,
he had "no doubt that the Attorney General may give priority to the
removal of deportable aliens who are members of such an organization,"
per Scalia's analysis.66 If the other four justices in the majority agree
with Scalia and Stevens, our hypothetical same-gender partner overstay
appears to have a tough road ahead, given what looks like a rather narrow window of relief.
While Justice Ginsburg focused mostly on the statute's construction, she devoted part of her concurrence to Scalia's selective enforcement analysis. While initially concluding that this issue was not before
the Court, Ginsburg stated that she was "not persuaded that selective
enforcement of deportation laws should be exempt" from judicial scrutiny, citing the Court's review of selective prosecution cases in the criminal law context.6 7 While Scalia drew a distinction between criminal
proceedings and civil deportation hearings (which he argued counseled
against judicial intervention in selective deportation claims), 68 Ginsburg
stressed the hardships wrought by deportation, including separating families. 69 This suggests that Justice Ginsburg is more likely than the
majority to recognize a broad selective deportation claim beyond creating special exemptions for "rare cases."
Justice Souter's dissenting opinion also expressed displeasure with
the Court's discussion of the unbriefed selective deportation claim,
quickly dismissing it as dictum.7 0 While he too believed that the differences between criminal and immigration law do not obviate the need for
a selective deportation defense, Souter disclaimed, siding with the
64. Scalia was taken to task on this point by both Ginsburg and Souter. See AADC, 525 U.S.
at 497 (Ginsburg., J., concurring), 511 (Souter, J., dissenting).
65. As will be developed infra, Scalia's consistent anti-gay rights voting record in Evans,
Hurley, and Dale, as well as his deference to Congress in Miller and Nguyen, imply that he would
probably not regard claims made by same-gender partner overstays as exceptional. See infra Part

11(C)(l).
66. AADC, 525 U.S. at 501 (Stevens, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 497 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 491 ("While the consequences of deportation may assuredly be grave, they are not
imposed as a punishment.") (internal citations omitted).
69. Id. at 498 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing GERALD NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE
CONSTITUTION 162 (1996)).

70. Id. at 510-11 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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noncitizen on this issue: "I do not assume that the Government would
lose the argument."'" Like Ginsburg, Souter would probably be more

receptive to a selective deportation claim than Scalia and his colleagues
in the majority.
Leading commentary on the AADC case construes the majority's
rejection of selective deportation claims as being rooted in a desire to
limit remedies available to acknowledged deportees. Professors Gerald
Neuman, David Cole, and David Martin all agree that the best analysis
of Scalia's opinion is one which gives credence to the Court's fear that if

deportees were successful in establishing a selective enforcement claim,
they might be entitled to permanent injunctive relief from removal, an
arguably unjust result when the noncitizen concedes deportability.72 A
fairer response, Professor Neuman argues, would be to remand the case

"for an exercise of enforcement discretion untainted by the [constitutionally] impermissible motive."7 3 Such reconsideration would properly

balance the constitutional interests of the noncitizen against the government's desire to halt an admitted immigration violation. 74 But even
under this analysis, the INS and Department of Justice retain much
unfettered power to proceed against deportable noncitizens as they wish,
constrained only by the yet-to-be-defined standard of "outrageous"
71. Id. at 511 (Souter, J., dissenting).
72. Gerald L. Neuman, Terrorism, Selective Deportation and the First Amendment After
Reno v. AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313, 345 (2000) ("[T]o the extent that the majority's
concerns about continuing frustration of immigration policy are well-founded, they might ... be
accommodated by adopting a narrower remedy for retaliatory deportation proceedings."); David
Cole, Damage Control?A Comment on Professor Neuman's Reading of Reno v. AADC, 14 GEO.
IMMGR. L.J. 347, 359 (2000). Cole states:
A better approach would be to stress the Court's explicit concern with remedy. The
Court seemed particularly driven by its belief that acknowledging a selective
enforcement defense would sanction an ongoing violation of law by allowing an
alien unlawfully here to remain. Similarly, it was troubled by the delays in the
immigration process that adjudicating such a claim might occasion, delays that
would likely arise only if an injunction against the deportation proceedings were
available. These concerns suggest that the Court's holding may be better understood
as precluding a particular form of remedy-an injunction against deportation-for
discriminatory enforcement of the immigration laws.
See also Martin, supra note 50, at 365 ("To say that the Constitution does not support a judicial
remedy of the kind claimed in AADC for alleged selective enforcement makes far more sense than
implying that the Constitution has no bearing whatever on these enforcement decisions."). For a
broader analysis of the First Amendment implications of AADC, see Maryann Kamali Miyamoto,
The FirstAmendment After Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee: A Different
Bill of Rights for Aliens?, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. RaV. 183 (2000).
73. Neuman, supra note 72, at 345.
74. Professor Martin believes that the majority's position on selective enforcement is a
desirable one which will permit the already overworked INS and DOJ to function more, not less,
effectively by "free[ing] up a more humane use of enforcement discretion by the [DOJ] and [INS]
in the future." Martin, supra note 50, at 365.
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conduct.7 5
Furthermore, although the AADC plaintiffs and the lower courts
based their selective deportation claim on the First Amendment, the
Supreme Court's constitutional analysis was broader in scope.76 Justice
Scalia's reasoning in AADC did not even mention the noncitizens'
speech or associational rights as being bases of a valid constitutional
claim, focusing instead on the more ambiguous term "outrageous" governmental action. As Professor Cole notes, "the decision is about selective enforcement claims in particular, and not about the First
Amendment rights of aliens more generally."7 7
Scalia's selective deportation analysis, agreed to by five other justices, appears to defer broadly to the government to enforce immigration
laws as it sees fit, constrained only by a vague standard of "outrageous"
conduct. At best, we know that the selection of admittedly deportable
noncitizens based on their suspected terrorist affiliations is not outrageous. But we know little beyond that.
This article attempts to give content to Scalia's test by contending
that "outrageous" selective enforcement is one in which the government
intends to oppress an individual or group based on a disadvantaged status, rather than an objective desire to enforce the immigration laws. Put
another way, the "outrageous" test is but another version of a "minimal
protection" test akin to equal protection or due process "rational basis"
scrutiny. Under this scheme, the Court will strike down legislative or
executive action only if: (1) it views the plaintiff as a having been
unfairly deprived of a right open to all, and who asks only for "equal,"
as opposed to "special," treatment; and (2) it can identify no legitimate
governmental interest to preserve majority sentiment, expressed either
through legislative policy, executive action, or a core constitutional
value. This analysis is based on a review of the Court's more recent
writings in the area of gay and immigrants' rights - both constitutional
and subconstitutional - concluding that while the Court is sometimes
75. Professors Neuman and Cole have speculated that targeting certain individuals because of
their speech or race may constitute "outrageous" behavior. See Neuman, supra note 72, at 346
("Immigration officials should not be permitted to target aliens, even undocumented aliens, for
removal because they participated in demonstrations against Proposition 187, or because they
complained of mistreatment in a detention facility."); Cole, supra note 72, at 360 ("[Outrageous]
suggests that the Court was seeking to forestall a parade of horribles: an INS plan to selectively
deport all black aliens, or all immigrants who have supported the Democratic party."). Neither,
however, has explored the selective deportation scenario explored in this article (nor has anyone
else, to this author's knowledge).
76. See Neuman, supra note 72, at 314 ("Although it is possible that members of the majority
do believe that the First Amendment does not significantly constrain federal deportation power,
that is not what the opinion says, and may not be a necessary implication of its reasoning.").
77. See Cole, supra note 72, at 348.
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willing to protect the constitutional rights of homosexuals and noncitizens, it is generally reluctant to do so absent particularly discriminatory
governmental conduct and the absence of a legitimate, countervailing
interest. The "outrageous" test outlined in AADC is but a variant of the
constitutional and subconstitutional analyses employed in the cases
described below.
The remainder of Part II unfolds in three sections. Reviewing the
gay rights cases, Section B demonstrates that while an unprotected class,
homosexuals appear to be granted constitutional protection from egregious discriminatory government conduct based on their sexual orientation when they do not claim any special substantive rights or impinge
upon the constitutional rights of others. Analogously, Section C's analysis of the immigration cases reveals that, while the Court is generally
reluctant to interfere with the political branches' immigration power, it
will protect the rights of noncitizens to be free from extreme governmental misconduct, unless the government has a legitimate reason for
discriminating against a particular group. Based on the foregoing, Section D attempts to define the contours of Scalia's AADC test, applying
the two factors described above - the targeting of a disadvantaged group
balanced against any countervailing federal or constitutional interest - to
the case of our hypothetical same-gender partner overstay.
B.

The Court's Recent Opinions on Gay Rights

78
Effectively comprehending the Court's gay rights jurisprudence
requires us to compare two sets of cases - Bowers v. Hardwick7 9 and
Romer v. Evans,80 on the one hand - and Hurley V. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston,8 and Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale,82 on the other. In each case, we see the Court struggle with conceptions of substantive due process, equal protection, and First Amendment rights that might provide us with bases for measuring the scope of
the rare "outrageous" selective prosecution case hypothesized by Justice
Scalia.

78. On the history and development of gay rights in the United States, see generally
ESKRIDGE, supra note 29; DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, IDENTITY AND THE CASE FOR GAY RIGHTS:
RACE, GENDER, RELIGION AS ANALOGIES

(1999);

DUDLEY CLENDINEN AND ADAM NAGOURNEY,

OUT FOR GOOD: THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD A GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA

79. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
80. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
81. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).

82. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).

(1999).
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DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL

PROTECTION AS APPLIED TO GAY RIGHTS

Michael Hardwick's appearance before the Supreme Court was the
result of a concerted effort to find a test case to challenge the legality of
state sodomy laws. The police arrested Hardwick for engaging in sex
with another man in the privacy of his apartment after being discovered
there by a Georgia police officer who had been invited in by a friend.
The officer was there to serve a warrant on Hardwick for public drinking, an offense for which Hardwick had already paid a fine, unbeknownst to the officer. Although originally arrested and temporarily
jailed under the state's sodomy law, Hardwick's charges were quickly
dropped, but not before an ACLU attorney had persuaded Hardwick to
file suit challenging the Georgia law.8 3
As the case wound its way up to the SUpreme Court, one of the
leading issues was whether the Court would be willing to extend its
conception of constitutional protection of private conduct against
charges of immorality by a substantial number of the populace. During
the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Court protected a wide range of private activity under the rubric of Fourteenth Amendment "substantive
due process," including the choice to use contraception 84 and the right of
abortion.85 Thus, one key question was whether the Court would protect
from governmental sanction the right to consensual sexual activity conducted in the privacy of one's home.
In a five-to-four decision, the Court answered in the negative.
Bowers v. Hardwick stands for the proposition8 6 that the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide homosexuals a
constitutional right to engage in sodomy, thus affirming a state's right to
criminalize such conduct.87 Joined in the majority by Justices Burger,
Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, Justice White noted that homosexual
sodomy was not a substantive liberty right "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition."88 On the contrary, laws prohibiting such
83. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 513-14 (1994) (discussing
background facts of Hardwick case). For a discussion of the facts from Michael Hardwick's
perspective, see PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS: SIXTEEN AMERICANS WHO
FOUGHT THEIR WAY TO THE SUPREME COURT 392-403 (1988).

84. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

85. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
86. Although recently, Professor Marc Spindelman has called for a reexamination of the
traditional holding of Hardwick, using a modified analogy to the miscegenation controversy in
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Marc S. Spindelman, Reorienting Bowers v. Hardwick, 79
N.C. L. REV. 359 (2001).
87. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.

88. Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (opinion of
Powell, J.)).
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acts "have ancient roots."8 9 Further, White confirmed the majority's
reluctance to expand the concept of substantive due process to recognize
new rights "without express constitutional authority," invoking the historical wrangling over unenumerated socioeconomic rights during the
1930s. 90 Finally, the Court rejected Hardwick's claim that prevailing

public sentiment about the immorality of homosexuality was irrational,
leaving intact the sodomy laws of then some twenty-five states. 9 1
The four dissenters 92 questioned the Court's narrow characteriza-

tion of the issue before it, broadly depicting the right at stake as "the
right to be let alone."93 From that premise, both Justice Blackmun's and
Stevens's dissents focused, albeit in slightly different ways, on the leg-

acy of privacy carved out by the Court's precedents in the realm of personal choice that they believe protected the "right to engage in
nonreproductive, sexual conduct," even if it offends others.9 4
The deeply divided Court was not aided by revelations that Justice
Powell had originally sided with the dissenters in conference, but later
switched his vote to side with the majority in upholding the Georgia
sodomy law. 95 Powell attempted to soften the decision's blow by writ-

ing a concurrence raising the possibility of an Eighth Amendment objection had Hardwick's sodomy prosecution gone forward. 96
When questioned four years later about his decision in Hardwick,
Powell reflected that he "probably made a mistake in that one," noting
that his subsequent reading of the opinions in the case suggested to him
that the dissenters had the better argument. 97 As Powell's biographer,
Professor John Jeffries, explains, "As startling as his change of heart

may have seemed, it was really no more than his continuing unease at
89. Id.

90. Id. at 194-95. The controversy over substantive due process during the post-LochnerNew
Deal period has been the source of much debate both within and outside the legal literature. See,
e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 14-15 (1980) (analogizing the debates over
Lochner to the 1970s controversies over Roe v. Wade); DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER 313
(4th ed. 1996). O'Brien stated:
In Lochner, a majority read into the Fourteenth Amendment a "liberty of contract"
in order to strike down economic legislation. Although the Court later abandoned
the doctrine of "liberty of contract," Lochner continues to symbolize the original sin
of constitutional interpretation - that is, the Court's creation and enforcement of
unenumerated rights.
91. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
92. Of Justices Blackmun, Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens, the Bowers dissenters, only
Justice Stevens still serves on the Court.
93. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
94. Id. at 203-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 216-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. JEFRIES, supra note 83, at 522-24.
96. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197-98 (Powell, J., concurring).
97. See JEFFRIES, supra note 83, at 530.
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choosing between sodomy as a crime and sodomy as a fundamental
right. He had never come to rest on that question.. .." Powell would
have preferred to split the difference, not recognizing a homosexual's
right to engage in sodomy, but not allowing for the criminal persecution
of gays. Clearly, Justice Powell feared the slippery slope. Professor
Jeffries further notes:
After all, if homosexuals had a constitutional right to engage in sex,
would they not also have the right to object to any form of regulation
or restriction disadvantaging them for having done so? Would gays
then have a constitutional right to serve in the military or in the intelligence agencies? Would they have a right to teach in public school
or work in day care centers? Would there be a constitutional requirement that the law allow homosexual adoption or same-[gender]
marriage?99
It was a further slide along that same slippery slope that likely gave
rise to the litigation in Romer v. Evans, the Court's next major foray into
the arena of gay rights. On the heels of successful local initiatives to
provide protection from sexual orientation discrimination in such cities
as Denver and Boulder, the citizens of Colorado decided to amend their
constitution to prohibit any state or local governmental body from taking
steps to protect gays and lesbians." ° Pro-"Amendment 2" advocates
described the law as a way to ensure that gays and lesbians did not
receive special privileges from the government, arguing that civil rights
statutes should be reserved for the truly deserving, such as racial minorities.' o' Some of the supporting rhetoric likened gay rights legislation to
special protections for white males:
For example: Young-Caucasian-males-without-disabilities aren't a
protected class. Claims of discrimination are not accepted on the
basis of being a Caucasian-male-without-disabilities. But does this
98. Id.

99. Id. at 518.
100. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623-24 (1996). Colorado's "Amendment 2" reads:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation.
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any
of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact,
adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual,
lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or
otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim
any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.
This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
Id. at 624.
101. See EVAN GERSTMANN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERCLASS 96-97 (1999) (describing
rhetoric distinguishing racial discrimination from sexual orientation discrimination). For more on
the Evans decision, see generally Symposium, Romer v. Evans, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 89
(1997); Symposium, Gay Rights and the Courts: The Amendment 2 Controversy, 68 U. CoLo. L.
REV. 287 (1997).
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mean that someone belonging to this group has no legal recourse? Of
course not. Just ask a Caucasian male, Allen Bakke. If he hadn't had
legal recourse, there wouldn't be a famous Supreme Court reversediscrimination case named after him.'0 2 For Bakke to get that
recourse, however, we didn't have to make Caucasian-males a specially protected class, or declare them, as a group, immune from discrimination. That would have destroyed the whole meaning of civilrights. And so will protected status for homosexuals... Once more

for the record: anti-discrimination laws were written to protect 0spe3
cially protected classes-groups who've proven they need help.'
In response, oppositionists had difficulty diffusing the force of the "special rights sound bite" unleashed by the law's supporters. As one antiAmendment 2 activist remarked, "[T]here is no good phrase or slogan to
counter 'special rights.' It takes fifteen minutes of real discussion to
undo the damage that phrase does."' 1 4
Amendment 2 passed by a narrow margin: 53.4 percent voted for it,
while 46.6 percent voted against it.' 0 5 Ironically, polls conducted by the
Denver Post before and after the vote suggest that most Coloradans did
not believe in discriminating against homosexuals in the areas of
employment and housing, for example, which Amendment 2 would have
allowed. 106

Just as Justice Powell's Hardwick concurrence struggled over how
to protect homosexuals from criminal prosecution without conferring
upon them new constitutional entitlements, the Colorado voters faced a
similar dilemma: Would approval of Amendment 2 promote gay rights
beyond providing them with the protection from prosecution we believe
they should receive? It is in this factual context that this next debate
over gay rights came before the Supreme Court.
In Evans, six justices struck down Colorado's Amendment 2 on the
ground that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Specifically, Justices O'Connor, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Kennedy's opinion declaring that even
though homosexuals are not a constitutionally protected class, the
Amendment's avowed purposes fail to pass even the deferential rational
basis standard:
Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even [the rational basis test.] First,
the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and
undifferentiated disability on a single named group, an exceptional
102. See Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
103.
104.
105.
106.

See GERSTMANN, supra note 101, at 108.
Id. at 105.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 99-102.
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and, as we shall explain, invalid form of legislation. Second, its sheer
breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the
amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the
class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state
interests. 107
More specifically, the Court thought Amendment 2's unprecedented
blanket denial of access to legal protection imposed upon homosexuals
thwarted the very purpose of equal protection jurisprudence, °8 and that
the avowed rationales for the provision bore no rational relationship to a
legitimate state purpose other than to discriminate against homosexuals
qua homosexuals. "9
Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas in dissent,
Justice Scalia viewed the battle over Amendment 2 as pure politics with
which the Court should not have involved itself. In his view:
The constitutional amendment before us here is not the manifestation
of a "'bare ... desire to harm"' homosexuals, but is rather a modest
attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sex-

ual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to
revise those mores through use of the laws.1 o
More pointedly, Scalia chastised the majority for not even mentioning Bowers v. Hardwick, which he characterized as the "the case most
relevant to the issue before us today ...

"'

He framed the issue

107. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
108. Id. at 633.
Amendment 2 confounds this normal process of judicial review. It is at once too
narrow and too broad. It identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them
protection across the board. The resulting disqualification of a class of persons from
the right to seek specific protection from the law is unprecedented in our
jurisprudence. The absence of precedent for Amendment 2 is itself instructive;
"[d]iscriminations of an unusual character especially suggest careful consideration
to determine whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional provision."
Id. (quoting Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37-38 (1928)).
109. Id. at 635.
The primary rationale the State offers for Amendment 2 is respect for other citizens'
freedom of association, and in particular the liberties of landlords or employers who
have personal or religious objections to homosexuality. Colorado also cites its
interest in conserving resources to fight discrimination against other groups. The
breadth of the amendment is so far removed from these particular justifications that
we find it impossible to credit them. We cannot say that Amendment 2 is directed
to any identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objective. It is a status-based
enactment divorced from any factual context from which we could discern a
relationship to legitimate state interests; it is a classification of persons undertaken
for its own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit. "[Cllass
legislation ... [is] obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment ......
Id. (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S., 3, 24 (1883)).
110. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11l. Evans, 517 U.S. at 640.
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squarely: "If it is constitutionally permissible for a State to make homosexual conduct criminal, surely it is constitutionally permissible for a
State to enact laws merely disfavoring homosexual conduct."" 12
One can distinguish Hardwick and Evans on doctrine and on fact.
Doctrinally, Hardwick is a due process case, while Evans sounds in
equal protection. Factually, the Georgia sodomy law in Hardwick was
to be applied only to homosexual conduct, while Amendment 2 in Evans
was to be extended to status. Yet, the Evans majority's failure to point
out these differences and the apparent incongruity of results which Justice Scalia suggests make for an uneasy peace. Worse still, the availability of both Hardwick and Evans as valid Supreme Court precedent make
prognostication on future gay rights rulings difficult. Perhaps this is
what the Supreme Court intended. As Professor William Eskridge
explains:
Judges are no longer constrained by Hardwick in equal protection
cases and can follow Evans's lead if they choose to do so. But judges
desiring to reject challenges to antigay policies can follow Hardwick
and limit Evans to its unusual facts. This lack of authoritative guidance is probably what the Supreme Court expected after Evans: state
courts and lower federal courts would struggle with issues of sexual
orientation discrimination on a case-by-case basis, less constrained
by Supreme Court precedent because of the Hardwick versus Evans
choice now available.' 13
While the availability of Evans certainly blunts Hardwick's impact,
the latter is still viable precedent for courts inclined to uphold antihomosexual laws. Further, in the context of our hypothetical selective
deportation of same-gender partner overstays, Hardwick and Evans, by
themselves, provide more limited guidance because they review state,
rather than federal, restrictions on gay rights. An INS decision to deport
will be viewed with considerably more deference than a state statute,
even for constitutional purposes, because of the plenary power and
Chevron doctrines, which confer virtually limitless discretion upon Congress and administrative agencies, respectively." 4 Before exploring an
answer to the opening hypothetical, it might be useful to first examine
the justices' views in Hardwick and Evans for some hint as to how they
might vote.
Since it is Justice Scalia's AADC opinion on what might constitute
an "outrageous" selective deportation that ultimately concerns us, let us
112. Id. at 641 (emphasis in original).
113. ESKRIDGE, supra note 29, at 172.
114. For a recent review of the persistence of the plenary power doctrine and the applicability
of the Chevron U.S.A. v Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), doctrine to the Eli~in
Gonzdlez case, see generally Victor C. Romero, On Elidn, supra note 39, at 381-85.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:537

start with him. Although not a participant in Hardwick, Scalia's dissent
in Evans suggests that he might be reluctant to afford any "special
rights" to deportable same-gender partners in light of a long-standing
deference to legislative fiat in the area of immigration."I5 Just as Scalia
was willing to defer to Colorado's democratic process which led to
Amendment 2's passage, he might likewise be willing to leave foreign
policy matters to the better judgment of the federal political branches,
especially in the case of a non-suspect class such as homosexuals.' 16
Then again, Scalia must have had something in mind when he set forth
his "outrageous" theory; the open question is whether the selective
deportation of a non-suspect class by a federal government otherwise
properly exercising its immigration power is sufficiently "outrageous."
Like Scalia, Kennedy did not participate in Hardwick, although he
penned the majority opinion opposite Scalia's dissent in Evans. Kennedy's words reveal a justice who is willing to protect a non-suspect
class even under the normally deferential "rational basis" test." 7 Would
115. In Evans, Scalia chastizes the majority for failing to cite Hardwick, which he believed
controlled the outcome in Evans because homosexuals did not deserve "special protections." See
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 641 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia stated:
If it is constitutionally permissible for a state to make homosexual conduct criminal,
surely it is constitutionally permissible for a State to enact other laws merely
disfavoring homosexual conduct. (As the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit has aptly put it: "If the Court [in Bowers] was unwilling to object
to State laws that criminalize the bahavior that defines the class, it is hardly open...
to conclude that state sponsored discrimination against the class is invidious. After
all, there can hardly be more palpable discrimination against a class than making the
conduct that defines the class criminal." Padula v. Webster, 822 F2d 97, 103
(1987).) And a fortiori it is constitutionally permissible for a State to adopt a
provision not even disfavoring homosexual conduct, but merely prohibiting all
levels of State government from bestowing special protections upon homosexual
conduct. (emphasis in original).
116. In another context, Justice Scalia wrote the following in a decision upholding Oregon's
refusal of unemployment benefits to Native Americans who were fired because of their use of
peyote, a controlled substance, in a religious ritual: "We have never held that an individual's
religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that
the State is free to regulate." Employment Div. Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990). While Justice Scalia joined a subsequent opinion by Justice Kennedy in
which the Court struck down a law that was specifically enforced against a particular religious
group, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah,508 U.S. 520 (1993), the discrimination
involved in that case burdened a fundamental religious right under the First Amendment, an issue
which was not true in Evans or in the opening narrative. For more on Smith and Lukumi, see
generally Garrett Epps, What We Talk About When We Talk About Free Exercise, 30 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 563 (1998) (discussing Smith-Lukumi as applied to state prohibition of polygamous
marriages).
117. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 630-631 (1996) ("In the course of rejecting the
argument that Amendment 2 is intended to conserve resources to fight descrimination against
suspect classes, the Colorado Supreme Court made the limited observation that the amendment is
not intended to affect many anti-discrimination laws protecting nonsuspect classes, Romer 11, 882
P.2d at 1346, n.9. In our view that does not resolve the issue. In any event, even if, as we doubt,
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he be willing to protect the same class of individuals when the federal
government exercises its well-established power over immigration by
conducting a selective, but otherwise legitimate, removal of a same-gender partner overstay? This is difficult to answer at this juncture, but a
review of several other cases in the gay rights and immigration rights
areas suggest perhaps an affirmative answer, which will be fully developed below." 8
Like Scalia and Kennedy, four other justices on the current Court
were not sitting when Hardwick was issued: Justices Thomas, Breyer,
Ginsburg, and Souter did not participate in the 1986 decision. Unlike
Scalia and Kennedy, however, these four did not issue opinions in Evans
either. At best, we can take note of their alliances - Thomas sided with
Scalia in the Evans dissent; Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter joined Kennedy in the majority. Although not an uncommon alignment, this configuration does not tell us how each of these individuals would rule on
the constitutionality of our selective deportation narrative. But it does
provide us a small piece to what is admittedly a complex puzzle.'"
That leaves us with the three justices who participated in both
Hardwick and Evans: Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor. During the
ten years between Hardwick and Evans, the Court saw the ascendancy of
Justice Rehnquist to the Chief's position. Rehnquist authored opinions
in neither of the two cases, but voted with the majority in Hardwick and
the dissent in Evans, suggesting his reluctance to grant much constitutional protection to homosexuals.
Justice Stevens provides us with more guidance and some useful
language. His opinion in Hardwick and his decision to sign on to Blackmun's dissent suggest his willingness to extend the same substantive due
process rights to homosexuals engaged in private, consensual sex acts
already enjoyed by heterosexuals. 20 More importantly, his discussion
of the selective application of a neutral sodomy law against homosexuals
homosexuals could find some safe harbor in laws of general application, we cannot accept the
view that Amendment 2's prohibition on specific legal protections does no more than deprive
homosexuals of special rights. To the contrary, the amendment imposes a special disability upon
those persons alone. Homosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or may seek
without constraint.").
118. See infra Part II.(B) & (C).
119. In AADC, Justice Souter's objection to Scalia's discussion of the selective deportation
issue stemmed as much from the fact that the issue was unbriefed as to the substance of the
opinion. Reno v. AADC, 525 U.S. 471, 511 (1999) (Souter, J. dissenting) ("No doubt more could
be said with regard to the theory of selective prosecution in the immigration context, and I do not
assume that the Government would lose the argument. That this is so underscore the danger of
addressing an unbriefed issue that does not call for resolution even on the Court's own logic.").
120. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 214-20 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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provides an insight into how he might view the selective deportation of
same-gender partner overstays:
A policy of selective application must be supported by a neutral and
legitimate interest - something more substantial than a habitual dislike for, or ignorance about, the disfavored group. Neither the State
nor the Court has identified any such interest in this case. The Court
has posited as a justification for the Georgia statute "the presumed
belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable." But the Georgia electorate has
expressed no such belief - instead, its representatives enacted a law
that presumably reflects the belief that all sodomy is immoral and
unacceptable. Unless the Court is prepared to conclude that such a
law is constitutional, it may not rely on the work product of the Georgia Legislature to support'its holding. For the Georgia statute does
not single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special disfavored treatment.
Nor, indeed, does the Georgia prosecutor even believe that all
homosexuals who violate this statute should be punished. This conclusion is evident from the fact that the respondent in this very case
has formally acknowledged in his complaint and in court that he has
engaged, and intends to continue to engage, in the prohibited conduct, yet the State has elected not to process criminal charges against
2
him.' 1
Stevens's language implies a strong reluctance to condemn the
selective enforcement of criminal laws against homosexuals, especially
where the laws themselves are generally not enforced against known
offenders. As applied to the context of the same-gender partner overstay, Stevens might very well disapprove of the same selective discrimi2
nation even within the context of a civil deportation proceeding. 2
Moreover, his decision to join the Evans majority, albeit sans opinion,
strengthens the assumption that he would be sympathetic to a same-gender partner's selective prosecution claim.
Unlike the anti-gay rights Rehnquist or pro-gay rights Stevens, Justice O'Connor switched positions from an anti-gay rights ruling in
Hardwick to a pro-gay rights stance in Evans. Because she did not pen
any of the seven opinions in either of the two cases, however, the reasons for her switch are at best, subject to speculation. 23 At one level,
she might have been persuaded that the doctrinal and factual differences
121. Id. at 219 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
122. Although he concurred with the majority in AADC, Justice Stevens's opinion was based

on his construction of the statute and not on the selective prosecution grounds discussed here.
AADC, 525 U.S. at 498-501 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
123. Chief Justice Rehnquist remained in the anti-gay rights camp while Justice Stevens sided
with the pro-gay rights faction in both decisions.
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between the cases124 distinguished the two sufficiently such that, despite
Scalia's protest, the Evans majority did not even have to mention Hardwick. Indeed, a recent report of her views during the Hardwick justices'
conference suggest that O'Connor may have regarded the plaintiff's
claim narrowly: "The right of privacy's source is the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of personal liberty. But this right is not absolute and
does not extend to private, consensual homosexuality. The state's legislative power to enact this [anti-sodomy] law is not unconstitutional as
exercised."' 2 5 At another level, perhaps Justice O'Connor was merely
practicing the pragmatism that characterized Justice Powell's jurisprudence without the same discomfort the earlier justice apparently had
with the issue of gay rights.
In sum, this brief review of the Court's Fourteenth Amendment gay
rights jurisprudence provides us with the following, very tentative, array
with respect to how the individual justices might rule on whether the
selective deportation of a same-gender partner was "outrageous" under
Justice Scalia's AADC opinion: Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas
would likely be unsympathetic; Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg would likely be sympathetic. Justice O'Connor is the
only justice whose gay rights position "changed" between Hardwick and
Evans, and is therefore the most difficult to predict.

2.

HURLEY & DALE: FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITS ON GAY RIGHTS

Aside from its Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process and
equal protection decisions in Hardwick and Evans, respectively, the
Court has twice examined the First Amendment rights of groups who
wish not to express pro-homosexual beliefs.
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston, 2 6 a unanimous Supreme Court overturned a Massachusetts
court's decision to enforce the state's anti-discrimination law by requiring parade organizers to allow a gay, lesbian and bisexual organization
to participate. Since 1947, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council has applied for, and been granted, the right to stage Boston's annual
St. Patrick's Day parade, an event that had previously been organized by
the city. In 1993, the Council denied GLIB, an organization of gay,
lesbian, and bisexual descendants of Irish immigrants, permission to
march in the parade as an organization, although it did not discriminate
27
against individual members from participation.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See supra note I1I and accompanying text.
See DEL DICKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN
515 U.S. 557 (1995).
Id. at 557, 560-66.

CONFERENCE

(1940-1985) 824 (2001).
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In a single, unanimous opinion by Justice Souter, the Court held
that the Council's decision to exclude GLIB was constitutionally protected from government coercion under the First Amendment. After
finding that the parade constituted a protected expressive activity, the
Court reasoned that the Council's action to exclude GLIB because of its
disagreement with the latter's message was constitutionally permissible.
"[W]hatever the reason, it boils down to the choice of a speaker not to
propound a particular point of view, and that choice is presumed to lie
beyond the government's power to control."12' 8 The Court also emphasized the difference between government regulating acts versus speech:
"While the law is free to promote all sorts of conduct in place of harmful
behavior, it is not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than
promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one, how129
ever enlightened either purpose may strike the government."'
As in Hurley, the Dale Court was asked to review a state court's
decision to enforce its anti-discrimination law in favor of a homosexual
against a private organization. Unlike the unanimity with which the
Court decided Hurley, however, a closely divided Court produced the
five-to-four split in Dale for which Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion appeared next to dissents by Justices Stevens and Souter, the
author of Hurley.
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,3' 0 Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and O'Connor joined the Chief Justice's opinion holding that the
Boy Scouts could not be required by New Jersey's anti-discrimination
law to re-admit James Dale as an assistant scoutmaster. Dale, a longtime scout and adult member, was expelled from the Boy Scouts when it
found out he was gay and a gay rights activist. The New Jersey
Supreme Court ruled that the state public accommodations anti-discrimination law mandated that the Boy Scouts reinstate Dale.' 3' The court
also stated that the Hurley case was inapposite since Dale's participation
in the Boy Scouts would "not compel the Boy Scouts to express any
message" to which they demurred.' 32
Chief Justice Rehnquist and four others disagreed with the New
Jersey court. Indeed, the majority found Hurley controlling:
Here, we have found that the Boy Scouts believes that homosexual
conduct is inconsistent with the values it seeks to instill in its youth
members; it will not "promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate
form of behavior." As the presence of GLIB in Boston's St. Patrick's
128. Id. at 575.

129. Id. at 579.
130. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).

131. Id. at 646.
132. Id. at 647.
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Day parade would have interfered with the parade organizers' choice
not to propound a particular point of view, the presence of Dale as an
assistant scoutmaster would just as surely interfere with the Boy
Scout's (sic) choice not to propound a point of view contrary to its
beliefs. 133
The Court then balanced this burden on the Boy Scouts' First Amendment rights against New Jersey's desire to protect homosexuals from
discrimination. The court concluded that enforcement of the state statute would materially interfere with the Boy Scout's constitutional
rights.' 34 Rehnquist noted that the state's interests did not permit such a
"severe intrusion," a result which was apparently anticipated by the Hur35
ley opinion.
Justices Stevens and Souter, Hurley's author, each filed a dissenting opinion. Both Ginsburg and Breyer joined each of the opinions;
Souter joined Stevens's opinion, but Stevens did not join Souter's.
Justice Stevens's six-part dissenting opinion focused largely on distinguishing Hurley in two key respects: First, Stevens engaged in a
lengthy review of the record in this case, concluding that the Boy
Scouts' allegations that its deep-seated belief that homosexuality is not
"morally straight" is supported not by the underlying facts but only by
bald statements in their briefs.' 36 And second, while he conceded that
the Boy Scouts have a right not to have Dale advocate homosexuality in
his role as an assistant scoutmaster, Stevens disagreed with the majority's conclusion that Dale's very presence in a scoutmaster's uniform
sends a message the Boy Scouts do not want to express:
Dale's inclusion in the Boy Scouts is nothing like the case in Hurley.
His participation sends no cognizable message to the Scouts or to the
world. Unlike GLIB, Dale did not carry a banner or a sign; he did
not distribute any fact sheet; and he expressed no intent to send any
message. If there is any kind of message being sent, then, it is by the
mere act of joining the Boy Scouts. Such an act does not constitute
an instance of symbolic speech under the First Amendment.' 3 7
133. Id. at 654.
134. Id. at 659.
135. Id. at 659 n.4. Rehnquist noted:
We anticipated this result in Hurley when we illustrated the reasons for our holding
in that case by likening the parade to a private membership organization. [Hurley,]
515 U.S., at 580, 115 S.Ct. 2338. We stated: "Assuming the parade to be large
enough and a source of benefits (apart from its expression) that would generally
justify a mandated access provision, GLIB could nonetheless be refused admission

as an expressive contingent with its own message just as readily as a private club
could exclude an applicant whose manifest views were at odds with a position taken
by the club's existing members." Id. at 580-581, 115 S.Ct. 2338.
136. Dale, 530 U.S. at 684-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

137. Id. at 695.
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Thus, Stevens concluded that the only viable justification for the majority's opinion is that "homosexuals are simply so different from the rest
of society that their presence alone-unlike any other individual's' 38
should be singled out for special First Amendment treatment."'
Justice Souter's dissent began with an affirmation of the first five
parts of Stevens's piece, but then disavowed allegiance to the sixth part,
which focused on society's growing acceptance of homosexuals. Joined
by Breyer and Ginsburg, Souter asserted that there is no constitutional
significance to Stevens's observations: "The fact that we are cognizant
of this laudable decline in stereotypical thinking on homosexuality
' 139
should not, however, be taken to control the resolution of this case."
Thus, Souter limited the grounds for his opposition to the fact that the
Boy Scouts have not made "sexual orientation the subject of any unequivocal advocacy."' 4 ° Stevens highlighted this point in his dissent to
distinguish the case from Hurley.
Following Hurley, a gay rights activist might be encouraged that
Dale was not a unanimous opinion. Examining the Court's language
regarding the relevance of anti-gay stereotypes in First Amendment
jurisprudence, however, it is clear that, save for Justice Stevens, the
Court's members believe that public pro- or anti-homosexual rhetoric
plays no role in the Court's constitutional analysis of a free expression
claim. This is evident not just in the passage from Souter's opinion
quoted above, but also in Chief Justice Rehnquist's admonition that
greater societal tolerance of homosexuality "is scarcely an argument for
denying First Amendment protection to those who refuse to accept these
views."' 4 ' To the extent that the seven other justices - all but Stevens signed on to either Rehnquist's or Souter's statements suggest that there
is little sympathy on the Court for considering popular trends, even if
they are supported by democratically enacted, anti-discrimination legislation. Indeed, as Rehnquist opines, "[T]he fact that an idea may be
embraced and advocated by increasing numbers of people is all the more
reason to protect the First Amendment rights of those who wish to voice
142
a different view."'

Although Justice Souter might agree with Rehnquist about the irrelevance of anti-gay sentiment in analyzing a First Amendment claim, he
appears to welcome the idea that negative stereotypes are fading from
view. Specifically, he applauds the "laudable decline"' 43 in such think138. Id. at 696.
139. Id. at 701 (Souter, J., dissenting).
140. Id.
14 1. Id. at 660.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 701 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The fact that we are cognizant of this laudable decline
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ing. To the extent that Justices Breyer and Ginsburg also signed on to
the Souter opinion, it is not unfair to suggest that they might likewise
agree with his assessment. Justice Stevens clearly supports this belief,
as demonstrated by Part VI of his opinion."' Finally, given Kennedy's
pro-gay rights stance in Evans and O'Connor's vote switch from Hardwick to Evans, it is possible that these two swing voters would likewise
applaud the decline of invidious sexual orientation stereotyping, especially given their apparent distaste for negative gender stereotypes, as
45
will be explored below.
Thus, despite the fact that three of the four opinions reviewed here
might, at first blush, be described as anti-gay rights, there might be sufficient sentiment on the Court for protecting homosexuals more than is to
be expected. Specifically, a majority of the Court - Justices Stevens,
Souter, Breyer, Ginsburg, O'Connor, and Kennedy - may be unwilling
to tolerate much stereotypical, animus-based discrimination against
homosexuals outside the confines of a First Amendment debate.
Further, the Court itself has stated that issues of discrimination are
properly raised within the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, as
opposed to being grounded elsewhere in the Constitution. In Whren v.
United States,'4 6 for example, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' asser-

tions that they were constitutionally protected from racially-motivated
traffic stops by the Fourth Amendment's provisions for reasonable
searches and seizures. Instead, the Court stated that any selective prosecution claims should be brought as alleged violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.' 47 Interestingly, the Court in
in stereotypical thinking on homosexuality should not, however, be taken to control the resolution
of this case.").
144. Id. at 700 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens wrote:
That such prejudices are still prevalent and that they have caused serious and
tangible harm to countless members of the class New Jersey seeks to protect are
established matters of fact that neither the Boy Scouts nor the Court disputes. That
harm can only be aggravated by the creation of a constitutional shield for a policy
that is itself the product of a habitual way of thinking about strangers. As Justice
Brandeis so wisely advised, "we must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our
prejudices into legal principles." If we would guide by the light of reason, we must
let our minds be bold. I respectfully dissent.
Id. (citations omitted).

145. See infra Part II(C) for a discussion of O'Connor's and Kennedy's views with respect to
gender stereotypes in Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
146. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
147. See id. at 813. In Whren, the Court stated:

We of course agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selective
enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race. But the constitutional
basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal
Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role in
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.
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Hurley specifically noted that GLIB did not raise an equal protection
claim and that the case was to turn instead on the Boy Scouts' First
Amendment expressive association argument.' 48 While it might have
had difficulty persuading the Court that sufficient state action was
involved to keep the claim alive, one wonders whether GLIB might have
been better off pursuing the equal protection argument, knowing now
that 1996's Evans, another equal protection decision, followed on the
heels of the 1995 Hurley decision.

Our hypothetical same-gender partner overstay might glean the following lesson from the preceding analysis of the Supreme Court's gay
rights cases. It appears that she would be best off emphasizing discrimination claims outside the realm of First Amendment free expression (as
in Hurley and Dale) or of special substantive due process rights (like in
Hardwick).'4 9 Instead, an equal protection analysis that emphasizes
extreme, animus-driven conduct by the government based solely on sex-

ual orientation would be a better theme (as in Evans).150 Put another
way, the justices appear reluctant to either create new rights or violate
third parties' constitutional rights. Nonetheless, a majority of the Court
will uphold the cause of persons unduly discriminated against because of
their status rather than conduct.
This pattern of minimal judicial intervention is also reflected in the

Court's recent immigration and nationality cases: Miller v. Albright, 5 '
Id.
148. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557,
566 (1995).
Given the scope of the issues as originally joined in this case, it is worth noting
some that have fallen aside in the course of the litigation, before reaching us.
Although the Council presents us with a First Amendment claim, respondents do
not. Neither do they press a claim that the Council's action has denied them equal
protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
149. She could attempt to pursue a variant of the expressive association claim asserted in Dale
the "right of intimate association." See generally Kenneth Karst, The Freedom of Intimate
Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980). This option will be briefly explored, and ultimately
rejected because of Hurley-Dale. See infra note 228.
150. Because she would be asserting an equal protection-like claim against the federal
government, the plaintiff's claim would be based in the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
The Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia, does not
contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment which applies
only to the states. But the concepts of equal protection and due process, both
stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The
"equal protection of the laws" is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness
than "due process of law," and, therefore, we do not imply that the two are always
interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.
151. 523 U.S. 420 (1997).
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Nguyen v. INS, 152 and a pair of consolidated cases - Zadvydas v. Davis!
Ashcroft v. Ma 153 and INS v St. Cyr/INS v. Calcano-Martinez.5 4 When
it believes that the government is unfairly discriminating against a group
or individual based on noncitizen status, the Court steps in to protect
them. If the government has a strong countervailing federal interest in
maintaining the discriminatory practice, however, the Court will not
interfere.
C.
1.

The Court's Recent Opinions on Immigrants' Rights
THE PARALLEL TO HARDWICK-EVANS: MILLER-NGUYEN

Just as the characterization of the claims in Hardwick (substantive
due process) and Evans (equal protection) played such a crucial role in
these cases' outcomes, so too did characterization matter in Miller v.
Albright.'55 The analysis in Miller depended less on the constitutional
claim that was asserted (equal protection), however, than who was
asserting the right (citizen versus noncitizen). In the end, the Court's
failure to reach consensus on the equal protection claim in Miller
prompted it to grant certiorari this past term in Nguyen v. INS, 156 on the
same issue.
In Miller v. Albright, the Supreme Court issued a six-to-three decision where no opinion mustered more than three votes (indeed, the two
dissenting opinions were the threesomes). Lorelyn Penero Miller, the
daughter of a Filipino mother and American father who had never married, challenged a provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act
requiring United States citizen fathers, but not mothers, to assert their
paternity within eighteen years of the child's birth. Miller's primary
argument was that this was a form of unconstitutional gender discrimination built into the immigration code, especially given the enhanced
scientific methods of proving paternity today that made the INA provision appear to endorse the outmoded stereotype of the uncaring father.
The Court upheld the statute with three pairs of justices issuing different
opinions to justify the holding.
Justice Stevens, writing for himself and Chief Justice Rehnquist,
thought that a rational basis test (just as in Evans) applied to this equal
protection challenge on the theory that immigration policy is subject to
the plenary power of Congress. But even if a heightened form of scru152. 533 U.S. 53 (2000).
153. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
154. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
155. The portions of the text describing Miller were taken in large measure from my previous
work, Romero, On Elidn, supra note 39, at 357-59.
156. Nguyen v. INS, 208 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 530 U.S. 1305 (2000).
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tiny applied, Stevens believed that Congress's concern over fostering a
good relationship between father and child while the child is a minor,
among other reasons, satisfied this more stringent test.' 57
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, asserted that the Court
had no power to provide the relief Miller requested. To the extent that
Miller sought citizenship as her remedy, Scalia asserted that only Congress could confer this upon her, even if the Court was to agree with her
equal protection claim.' 58
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, seemed to suggest
that the viability of the gender-based equal protection claim was governed by who brought the suit. Because Miller was a noncitizen, the
challenged statute, as applied to her, would be upheld under the most
deferential "rational basis" standard of review. O'Connor therefore concluded that Stevens's analysis of the statute was correct. 59 However, in
an interesting piece of dicta, O'Connor noted that had Miller's father,
who had been erroneously dismissed from the case, remained in the suit,
the heightened scrutiny befitting a gender-based claim would have
applied, and O'Connor would have voted to strike down these
provisions. 160
The O'Connor opinion is particularly intriguing because its gender
discrimination analysis tracks that of the dissenters in Miller, all three of
whom voted to strike down the legislation. Over the course of two opinions, Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter agreed with the heightened
scrutiny standard mentioned in the O'Connor dicta. Unlike O'Connor,
however, none of the three justices found standing to be a relevant issue,
paving the way for Miller to assert her father's gender-based claim as a
16 1
third party.

The Miller decision is therefore as frustrating as it is encouraging
for individual constitutional rights claims. On the positive side, a solid
five-person majority on the Court asserted that gender-based stereotypes
could not survive an equal protection challenge even within the realm of
immigration and nationality law.16 1 On the other hand, the thrust of
O'Connor's dicta spoke only to the rights of citizens in conferring citizenship upon their noncitizen children born out of wedlock, rather than
157. Miller, 523 U.S. at 440.
158. Id. at 452-59 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 445-52.
160. Id. at 451-52.

161. Id. at 460-90.
162. For more on Miller, see generally Cornelia T. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller v.
Albright, 1998 Sup. CT. REv. 1; The Supreme Court 1997 Term: Gender DiscriminationImmigration and Nationality Act, 112 HARV. L. REV. 202-12 (1998).
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directly affirming the rights of the noncitizen herself. Indeed, even the
Breyer dissent noted that a deferential standard of review applies "in
[cases] involving aliens."16' 3
Nguyen v. INS resolved the issue which Miller left open: Could the

gender-based distinction governing the conferral of citizenship to an outof-wedlock foreign child survive heightened scrutiny under the Court's
equal protection jurisprudence? In a sharply divided 5-4 vote, Justice
Kennedy, joined by Scalia, Thomas, Rehnquist, and Stevens, held that it

did. Justice O'Connor, joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, filed a
dissent. 164
Interestingly, both the majority and dissent agreed on the proper
standard to be applied here, that of heightened or intermediate scrutiny
as befits gender-discrimination claims. As such, the government was

charged with asserting an important governmental objective that was
substantially related to the challenged gender-based classification. 165 It

was in the application of the test that the two sides differed. The majority found that the dual interests in assuring that: (1) "a biological parent-

child relationship exists;" 166 and (2) "the child and the citizen parent
have some demonstrated opportunity or potential to develop ... a rela-

tionship that ...consists of the real, everyday ties that provide a connec167
tion between child and citizen parent and, in turn, the United States"'
were substantially related to the gender-based classification. The dissent
rejected these ideas as the province of speculation and stereotype.

Despite Kennedy's authorship, Justice Stevens's influence was evident throughout the majority opinion. Aside from anchoring his analysis
168
on two governmental objectives first identified by Stevens in Miller,
163. Miller, 523 U.S. at 480 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
164. Justice Scalia, joined by Thomas, filed a concurring opinion tracking his earlier argument
in Miller that only Congress was authorized to confer citizenship, but felt it appropriate to reach
the equal protection issue since a majority of the Court was so inclined. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S.
53, 121 S.Ct. 2053, 2066 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring).
165. Id. at 2059. "For a gender-based classification to withstand equal protection scrutiny, it
must be established 'at least that the [challenged] classification serves 'important governmental
objectives and that the discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives."' Id. at 2066. O'Connor stated:
Because the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has not shown an
exceedingly persuasive justification for the sex-based classification embodied in 8
U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4)-i.e., because it has failed to establish at least that the
classification substantially relates to the achievement of important governmental
objectives-I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 2060.
167. Id. at 2061.
168. See Miller v. Allbright, 523 U.S. 420, 435 (1997) ("The [challenged provision] serves, at
least in part, to ensure that a person born out of wedlock who claims citizenship by birth actually
shares a blood relationship with an American citizen."). Id. at 438 ("Section 1409 also serves two
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Justice Kennedy specifically mentioned Stevens as having argued that
the gender neutrality advocated by the dissent masks the real biological
difference between mother (who is always present at the child's birth)
and father (who may not be). 169 Following Stevens's reasoning, Kennedy concluded that "the differential treatment is inherent in a sensible
statutory scheme, given the unique relationship of the mother to the
'70
event of birth."'
It is curious that Kennedy, who had joined O'Connor in Miller, and
not Stevens, adopted much of Stevens's reasoning in Nguyen. This is
particularly noteworthy given O'Connor's (and thus implicitly, Kennedy's) specific disavowal of Stevens's assertion in Miller that the statute would survive heightened scrutiny.' 7 1 Having been described as one
with a "streak of independence" '7 2 - a phrase most closely associated
other important purposes that are unrelated to the determination of paternity: the interest in
encouraging the development of a healthy relationship between the citizen parent and the child
while the child is a minor; and the related interest in fostering ties between the foreign-born child
and the United States.") (Stevens, J., concurring).
169. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. 53, 121 S.Ct. at 2061.
Finally, to require Congress to speak without reference to the gender of the parent
with regard to its objective of ensuring a blood tie between parent and child would
be to insist on a hollow neutrality. As Justice STEVENS pointed out in Miller,
Congress could have required both mothers and fathers to prove parenthood within
30 days or, for that matter, 18 years, of the child's birth. 523 U.S., at 436, 118 S.Ct.
1428. Given that the mother is always present at birth, but that the father need not
be, the facially neutral rule would sometimes require fathers to take additional
affirmative steps which would not be required of mothers, whose names will appear
on the birth certificate as a result of their presence at the birth, and who will have
the benefit of witnesses to the birth to call upon. The issue is not the use of gender
specific terms instead of neutral ones. Just as neutral terms can mask discrimination
that is unlawful, gender specific terms can mark a permissible distinction. The equal
protection question is whether the distinction is lawful. Here, the use of gender
specific terms takes into account a biological difference between the parents.
170. Id.
171. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 451-52.
Although I do not share Justice STEVENS' assessment that the provision
withstands heightened scrutiny, ante, at 1436-1442, 1 believe it passes rational
scrutiny for the reasons he gives for sustaining it under the higher standard. It is
unlikely, in my opinion, that any gender classifications based on stereotypes can
survive heightened scrutiny, but under rational scrutiny, a statute may be defended
based on generalized classifications unsupported by empirical evidence.
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
172. John Paul Jones, & Anthony McLeod Kennedy, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES:

A

BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 277 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1994). Another commentator described
the first five terms of Justice Kennedy's tenure thusly:
On balance, he has been a consistent member of the Court's conservative majority
on practically every issue. His cautious approach applies both to judicial technique
and to substantive results The most obvious feature to his judicial technique is a
strong respect for precedent. On occasion, however, Justice Kennedy is not a
technical conservative. At times, his analytical path to a restrictive result tramples

precedent and operates on the basis of questionable empirical assumptions.
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with Stevens's jurisprudence 173 - Kennedy's decision to break ranks
from his usual conservative allies was noted earlier in Evans.
This time, however, he abandoned the liberal wing perhaps because

of his concern about granting automatic citizenship to a large number of
children born of United States servicemen and their foreign partners.

Although never explicitly stated, Kennedy's caution surfaced during his
discussion about the biological differences between verifying maternity
versus paternity. After stating that, unlike biological mothers, fathers

may not be physically present at a child's birth, Kennedy invoked the
image of the millions of American soldiers stationed abroad, noting that
the vast majority are male. 74 The implication is that Congress did not
want to grant automatic citizenship to binational "G.I. babies"; therefore,

the Court should be reluctant to thwart legislative intent by opening the
floodgates to a stream of new citizens. While "invasion" arguments are
as old as the Chinese Exclusion Case, 175 they are seldom tested empirically. Even assuming that automatic citizenship was conferred upon the
hypothetical millions of children sired by United States servicemen and
Theodore Eisenberg, Anthony M. Kennedy, in
OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

LEON FRIEDMAN

& FRED L.

ISRAEL, THE JUSTICES

1733 (1997).

One partial to the Nguyen dissent might argue, as Justice O'Connor does, that Kennedy's
majority opinion is at least inconsistent with the Court's most recent gender-based equal
protection cases (see, e.g., VMI and Hogan), if not the "trampling" of precedent that Professor
Eisenberg describes.
173. See, e.g., Sue Davis, John Paul Stevens, in SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 172, at
409 (noting that the distinguishing characteristic of Stevens's Supreme Court career has been his
independence).
174. "Given the nine month interval between conception and birth, it is not always certain that
a father will know that a child was conceived, nor is it always clear that even the mother will be
sure of the father's identity. This fact takes on particular significance in the case of a child born
overseas and out of wedlock. One concern in this context has always been with young people,
men for the most part, who are on duty with the Armed Forces in foreign countries. See
Department of Defense, Selected Manpower Statistics 48, 74 (1999) (reporting that in 1969, the
year in which Nguyen was born, there were 3,458,072 active duty military personnel, 39,506 of
whom were female); Department of Defense, Selected Manpower Statistics 29 (1970) (noting that
1,041,094 military personnel were stationed in foreign countries in 1969); Department of Defense,
Selected Manpower Statistics 49, 76 (1999) (reporting that in 1999 there were 1,385,703 active
duty military personnel, 200,287 of whom were female); id. at 33 (noting that 252,763 military
personnel were stationed in foreign countries in 1999)." Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 121 S.Ct.
2053, 2061-62 (2001). See also David A. Martin, Behind the Scenes On A Different Set: What
Congress Needs To Do In The Aftermath of St. Cyr and Nguyen, 16 GEO. IMMIOR. L.J. 313, 335
(2002) ("If Nguyen had gone the other way, tens or hundreds of thousands of individuals of all
ages, with absolutely no social or experiential connection with life in the United States, would
suddenly have had all the rights associated with U.S. citizenship, including most importantly the
right to settle here. The Court, citing statistics about the wide travel of Americans and the posting
of U.S. soldiers overseas (presumably fathering non-marital offspring), abundantly signaled its
concern about such consequences.").
175. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 595 (1889) (noting California's
observation describing the influx of Chinese workers constituted "immigration in numbers
approaching the character of an Oriental invasion, and was a menace to our civilization").
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birthed by noncitizen women, it is likely that only a fraction of these
children raised in a foreign country would opt for American citizenship,
given class, cultural, and distance barriers.
Further, Kennedy might have believed that the hardship imposed
upon fathers is reasonable, unlike what he viewed as the virulent campaign waged against homosexuals in Evans.17 6 Kennedy noted that the
challenged INA code section provides three ways by which a parent may
confer citizenship upon a child: by legitimation; court paternity order; or
written acknowledgment of paternity. In addition, a child may seek citizenship separate and apart from his relationship to his biological father
based on the child's own ties to the United States.1 7 In contrast, Colorado's Amendment 2 would have rendered homosexuals powerless to
effect any anti-gay change in that state's law.
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor took the opposite view from Kennedy. She focused on the Court's departure from their recent genderbased equal protection jurisprudence, giving only lip service to the idea
of heightened scrutiny. 78 First, O'Connor questioned whether the
majority's proffered interest in providing fathers the potential to have a
relationship with their out-of-wedlock offspring was based on nothing
more than pure post-litigation argument rather than on congressional
intent. 79 But even assuming the validity of determining congressional
intent as the purported goal, O'Connor argued that a gender-neutral statute requiring the physical presence at or awareness of the child's birth
would have satisfied this interest.' 80 Second, because of the ease of
determining paternity through modern methods such as DNA testing,
O'Connor contended that protecting the statute's gender-based classification perpetuated an impermissible stereotype of the differences
between mothers and fathers.' 8 ' Thus, O'Connor concluded that the
majority's application of heightened scrutiny was incorrect, but hoped
that time will reveal Nguyen to be an aberration in the Court's equal
82
protection jurisprudence. 1
Even though he penned no opinion in Nguyen, Justice Stevens's
vote was not a surprise, given his endorsement of the challenged provision in Miller. Like Kennedy, Stevens probably viewed this statute as
simply equalizing the parenting responsibilities placed upon mothers
176. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (describing Amendment 2 as seeming
"inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects.
177. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. 53, 121 S.Ct. at 2064.

178. Id. at 2078 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 2068-69.

180. Id. at 2072-73.
181. Id. at 2069.
182. Id. at 2078-79.
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and fathers with respect to their illegitimate offspring. Moreover, given
Stevens's prior rejection of the Court's tripartite equal protection analysis, 183 perhaps Stevens felt no qualms about upholding the challenged

provision under either the "intermediate scrutiny" or "rational basis"
tests. "84
' Indeed, if Stevens's ultimate concern was protecting the rights
of the disadvantaged, then one can reconcile his votes in Evans and
Nguyen by distinguishing the great burden barriers to voting rights based
on sexual orientation might have when compared with the less onerous
burden on a father to actually take responsibility for his offspring by
declaring his paternity for citizenship purposes before the child's eight-

eenth birthday.
Yet, this analysis is not completely satisfying. Behind the citizen
fathers in Miller and Nguyen were noncitizen children who were denied
citizenship by virtue of the Court's rulings. Indeed, in earlier cases

involving both documented and undocumented immigrants, Stevens has
shown compassion for a class he has described as "already subject to
disadvantages not shared by the remainder of the community."18' 5 Reminiscent of Carolene Products,1 86 Stevens invoked that opinion's lan183. The Court has followed a three-tiered system of equal protection analysis, subjecting
racial classifications to strict scrutiny, gender classifications to intermediate review, and general
economic legislation to a "rational basis" test. See, e.g., JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 638-44 (6th ed. 2000). Justice Stevens, however, explicitly
rejected this approach in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring):
There is only one Equal Protection Clause. It requires every state to govern
impartially. It does not direct the courts to apply one standard of review in some
cases and a different standard in others .... I am inclined to believe that what has
become known as the two-tiered analysis of equal protection claims does not
describe a completely logical method of deciding cases, but rather is a method that
the Court has employed to explain decisions that actually apply a single standard in
a reasonably consistent fashion.
See also SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 172, at 411 ("Stevens has rejected [the Court's
equal protection analysis] arguing that the three standards of analysis cannot adequately explain
the Court's decisions.").
184. Interestingly, despite his prior rejection of the tripartite equal protection regime, Stevens
asserted in Miller that immigration and nationality law were areas over which Congress enjoyed
plenary power, thus entitling it to considerable deference. Miller v. Allbright, 523 U.S. 420, 434
n. 11 (1997) ("Deference to the political branches dictates 'a narrow standard of review of
decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of immigration and naturalization.')
(Stevens, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted). Although Kennedy appropriated much of
Stevens's Miller analysis, he specifically refused to address the issue of Congressional plenary
power in Nguyen. Nguyen, 533 U.S. 53, 121 S.Ct. 2053, 2065 ("In light of our holding that there
is no equal protection violation.., we need not assess the implications of statements in our earlier
cases regarding the wide deference afforded to Congress in the exercise of its immigration and
naturalization power.").
185. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 (1976).
186. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) ("prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends to seriously curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect those minorities...
[thus calling] .. .for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.").
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guage by describing immigrants as a "discrete and insular" minority. 187
But perhaps the question of hardship is one of degree for Stevens (and
likely for Kennedy as well): Notwithstanding the arguably blameless
status of the noncitizen children in Nguyen and Miller, Stevens would
likely distinguish the complete inability of homosexuals to thwart Colorado Amendment 2 because of its breadth with the relatively less burdensome task of seeking a declaration of paternity from one's father
within an eighteen-year period.
Of course, even this characterization fails to capture the reality that
for many noncitizen children, the labyrinthine Immigration and Nationality Act enforced by an overburdened federal agency 1 8 may make even
this apparently wide-open window of opportunity seem particularly narrow. As Stevens acknowledged previously, noncitizens "are not entitled
to vote and ... are often handicapped by a lack of familiarity with our
language and customs."' 189 Add to this the difficulty Ms. Penero Miller
faced in trying to have her United States based father acknowledge her
existence while she resided in the Philippines, 90 and the burdens faced
by the Evans and Miller/Nguyen plaintiffs appear not so different.
We are thus left to speculate as to how Nguyen might influence our
analysis of a same-gender partner's selective deportation claim, in light
of the Hardwick and Evans line of gay rights cases. 19 1 One thing is
187. Hampton, 426 U.S. at 102 (striking down federal regulations denying civil service
employment to legal permanent residents). Aside from penning the majority opinion benefitting
legal permanent residents in Hampton, Stevens also voted in favor of undocumented immigrants
in Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding unconstitutional Texas law depriving
undocumented immigrant children of public school education).
188. The travails of the INS are well-documented. In a recent study by Syracuse University's
Government Performance Project, the INS was judged the least reliable among the twenty
agencies surveyed, with a rating of "C-." All Things Considered: Immigration and Naturalization
Service Is Under Fierce Criticismfor Poor Leadership, Accountability and Management (NPR
radio broadcast, Apr. 6, 2000), available at 2000 WL 21470322.
189. Hampton, 426 U.S. at 102.
190. See Nancie L. Katz, High Court Hears Citizenship Case of Girl Abandoned by U.S.
Soldier, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Nov. 5, 1997, at A9 ("After a seven-month affair in the
Philippines, [Charlie Miller] says, he deserted Luz Penero. He had fought in Vietnam and wanted
to forget his six years in combat. He spent two decades ignoring his child's letters, but after 22
years, he wrote back.").
191. Aside from Nguyen, the Court recently decided one other case United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 121 S.Ct. 2164 (2001), which relates to administrative law and therefore
might greatly influence future immigration decisions. It modifies the long-standing Chevron
doctrine, as discussed earlier, which, requires the Court to generally defer to administrative
agency interpretations of ambiguous Congressional statutes. Specifically, the Court ruled that
Congress did not intend for the United States Customs Service's tariff classifications to have the
force of law, and thus, such classifications were not entitled to Chevron deference. Id. at 2177.
Rather than simply deferring to authoritative agency interpretations, the Court will examine first
whether Congress interpreted such agency action to have the force of law. Id. Thus, the Court
noted that "[it is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative action with
the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure [such as notice-
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clear: even though Evans permitted an avenue of equal protection argument that barred a state's action against homosexuals, the landscape
changes when the federal government's interests over immigration are at
stake. Justices whose views are as diverse as Rehnquist and Stevens
agree that, when it comes to immigration decisions, Congress has virtu-

ally unlimited power to regulate admissions and exclusions. Moreover,
the entire Court agreed to apply a heightened scrutiny test to the federal
statute in Nguyen that appeared to be a shadow of the robust rational
basis review applied to the state anti-homosexual law struck down in
Evans.

Examining his record in the four gay rights cases discussed here,
Justice Stevens voted in favor of homosexual rights in three of the four
lawsuits, including the equal protection suit in Evans. Yet, the selective
deportation suit might be more like Hurley than Evans for Stevens. Just

as Hurley involved the First Amendment's grant of rights to trump a
state's anti-discrimination law, so might Congress's plenary power to
authorize the deportation of overstays (and the INS's concomitant Chevron power to enforce it)' 92 trump Vermont's desire to confer its samegender partner benefits to those who decide to civilly unite. Then again,

Stevens's strong pro-gay rights rhetoric in Hardwick'9 3 suggests that his
understanding of the federal government's exercise of its deportation
power may not be selectively enforced, much in the way the Court
described the neutral Georgia sodomy law as targeting same-gender acts
only. Assuming he considers deportation a punishment of sufficient

consequence, Stevens might very well consider "outrageous" the selec-

and-comment provisions] tending to foster fairness and deliberation that should underlie a
pronouncement of such force." Id. at 2172. Because immigration law is administrative in nature,
Mead will likely have a significant impact upon INS actions in the future. However, it probably
will not have a particularly strong bearing on the issues discussed here.
For instance, in Mead, the Court cited with approval its recent decision in Christensen v.
Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000), in which it noted that agency interpretations contained
in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, lack the force of law and are
therefore not entitled to Chevron deference. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 121 S.Ct. at 2176 n.17 (citing
Christensen). Thus, Mead might support the idea that no deference should be given to INS's
selective enforcement because such deportation pursuant to an INS directive would not have the
force of law. However, this is a tenuous link, at best. More likely, Mead is arguably irrelevant
here because INS in this instance is not interpreting any Congressional statute. It is simply
enforcing a Congressional directive, the merits of which the deportee does not dispute. Indeed,
unlike the parties in Mead, Ms. Camacho, the foreign same-gender partner in the opening
narrative does not dispute her deportability under the statute; rather, she questions the INS's
decision to selectively deport her based on her sexual orientation.
192. See generally Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(holding that reviewing courts must give greater deference to agency's interpretation of its own
statutes).
193. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
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tive deportation of same-gender partner overstays as invidiously
unconstitutional.
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy also remain mysteries in this game
of prediction. On the one hand, they both voted for the class of homosexuals in Evans, yet they refused to side with the three dissenters in
Miller, based on their standing analysis, and then finally parted ways on
the constitutionality of the gender-based classification in Nguyen.
Indeed, save for the Evans and Nguyen decisions, O'Connor has voted
against gays or noncitizens in five of the seven cases surveyed thus far;
Kennedy has voted negatively on these issues in five of the six cases.
Yet, both O'Connor and Kennedy appear to loathe broad, stereotyped
depictions of groups based on sexual orientation (for both justices in
Evans) and, sometimes, gender (for only O'Connor in Nguyen). Aside
from Kennedy's strong stance against animus-based legislation in
Evans,'94 O'Connor's closing remarks in Nguyen are equally powerful:
No one should mistake the majority's analysis for a careful application of this Court's equal protection jurisprudence concerning sexbased classifications. Today's decision instead represents a deviation
from a line of cases in which we have vigilantly applied heightened
scrutiny to such classifications to determine whether a constitutional
violation has occurred. I trust that the depth and vitality of these
95
precedents will ensure that today's error remains an aberration.'
Kennedy and O'Connor display the same distaste as Souter for the
negative stereotypes that appeared in Dale.' 96 In adjudicating the selective deportation claim then, the key issue for O'Connor and Kennedy
will likely be whether the government's exclusive decision to remove
same-gender partners solely on the basis of their homosexuality is sufficiently analogous to Evans, a case striking anti-gay legislation on mere
rationality review, or, for O'Connor but not Kennedy, Nguyen, a case in
which O'Connor believed an invidious gender-based stereotype was
used to determine citizenship conferral. Whether the selective deportation of same-gender partner overstays is "outrageous" may be a difficult
issue for this pair of justices.
How Justices Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg rule seems more predictable. Despite Breyer's insistence that rational basis review governs
noncitizen suits, he was willing to find standing for the absent citizen
father in Miller and he joined O'Connor's dissent in Nguyen. Thus, he
might find the United States citizen partner of a deportable homosexual
194. See GERSTMAN, supra note 101, at 99-102; see also Romer v. Evans, 577 U.S. 620, 632-

33 (1996).
195. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 121 S.Ct. 2053, 2078 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
196. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 696, 700-02 (2000).
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overstay similarly situated. If so, his voting record on gay and immigrants' rights issues suggests much sympathy for our hypothetical overstay. Breyer voted in favor of gay or immigrants' rights in four of the
six cases reviewed here -

Hurley and AADC being the exceptions.

Ginsburg's record is identical to Breyer's, while Souter sided with the
individual rights claimant in AADC, making his record five out of six.
Our analysis of Justices Rehnquist's, Thomas's, and Scalia's likely
votes on the issue do not appear to change much after Miller and
Nguyen. Rehnquist has ruled solidly against providing much protection
for gays or noncitizens in all of the cases examined, while Thomas and
Scalia have ruled the same way in the cases in which they have participated, if for different reasons.
Thus, after reviewing the first two immigration cases - Miller and
Nguyen - and the four gay rights opinions - Hardwick, Evans, Hurley, and Dale - in light of the AADC "outrageous" exception test, it

appears that six justices are where they were before: Breyer, Souter,
Ginsburg on the pro-gay/immigrants' rights side, and Rehnquist, Scalia,
and Thomas, on the other. With his deference to the federal government's power in AADC, Miller, and Nguyen, Stevens's vote becomes
harder to call. And as always, O'Connor and Kennedy remain right in
the middle, especially after their appearance on either side of the Nguyen
debate.
The constitutional immigration law cases examined thus far Miller, Nguyen, and AADC -

appear to grant much power to the gov-

ernment in the areas of immigration and nationality law, leaving only an
undefined egregious selective enforcement claim as possible constitutional armor for deportable noncitizens. When viewed in light of the
gay rights cases explored earlier -

Hardwick, Evans, Hurley, and Dale

- the case of our foreign same-gender partner overstay might appear to
be a loser: Of the seven cases examined so far, the individual rights
claimant -

either the homosexual or the noncitizen -

has lost six of

the seven times, prevailing only in Evans.
Yet, the "outrageous" language from AADC coupled with the holding in Evans might provide sufficient ammunition for our hypothetical
deportee when viewed in the light of four subconstitutional law cases in reality, two pairs of related cases - recently decided by the Supreme
Court. Each of the previous seven cases reviewed emphasizes two
important factors that the Court weighs in deciding whether to uphold
the individual rights claim: whether the plaintiff asks for equal, not special treatment, in response to the government's discriminatory conduct;
and whether there is a legitimate countervailing federal or constitutional
interest to justify the prejudice. The remaining four opinions will
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demonstrate how egregious, unjustifiable governmental conduct raises
serious constitutional questions, even within the political, often non-justiciable realm of immigration law.
2.

THE COURT'S JUNE 2001 SUBCONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS ON
INDEFINITE DETENTION AND HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF ZADVYDAS/MA

AND ST. CYR/CALCANO-MARTINEZ

Thus far, we have examined the direct application of constitutional
norms to immigration and nationality cases by reviewing the Court's
decisions in Miller, Nguyen, and AADC. In each of these three cases, we
have noted how the Court has deferred to Congressional and INS power
over immigration matters, even when it has claimed to be exercising a
heightened review of their actions. Given the ineffectiveness of directly
applying constitutional norms in immigration cases, Professor Hiroshi
Motomura identified a second way by which the Court has historically
protected noncitizens' rights through phantom subconstitutional norms
to circumvent the question of the political branches' plenary power over
immigration. 19'
Relatedly, the Court's June 2001 subconstitutional decisions on two
immigration issues - indefinite detention and retroactive denial of
habeas corpus relief - might shed some light on the availability of five
votes in favor of our hypothetical same-gender partner overstay. Neither
of these two issues were constitutional in nature - indeed, the Court
took great pains to describe its holdings as statutory - yet, the Constitution informed how the five-person majorities found in favor of the immigrants. Specifically, the Court held that the statutory provision in each
case had to be read to avoid a serious constitutional question, which is a
well-known canon of statutory construction. 8 Despite the absence of
direct constitutional rulings, these 5-to-4 late-term decisions were
favorable to immigrants' rights advocates, and therefore, are worth
reviewing to try to discern why, whether constitutionally or subconstitutionally, five persons on the Court decided that the government had
acted in derogation of noncitizens' interests.

197. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
ConstitutionalNorms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 560-61 (1990); Hiroshi
Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogatesfor Substantive
ConstitutionalRights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992).
198. See Motomura, Phantom, supra note 197, at 560-61 ("A time-honored canon of statutory
interpretation, often invoked by citing Justice Brandeis' 1936 concurrence in Ashwander v.

Tennessee Valley Authority, says that judges should interpret statutes to avoid constitutional
doubt.").
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a. Zadvydas v. Davis and Ashcroft v. Ma: Indefinite Detention
The first issue involved whether the federal government had the
power to indefinitely detain a noncitizen who could not be deported
because no country was willing to receive her.'9 9 In the consolidated
cases Zadvydas v. Davis and Ashcroft v. Ma, the Court held that the
statutory provision governing the INS's power to detain pending deportation must be construed to avoid a Fifth Amendment due process violation, thereby requiring that a reasonable limitation be placed on the
government's power even though no such language appears in the statute's text. 20 0 The petitioners in both cases had been adjudged deportable
after having committed certain criminal offenses; however, after they
had been detained pursuant to statute, they could not effectively be
deported because their respective receiving countries would not grant
them entry.2 0 ' Indeed, for Kim Ho Ma, the prospect of ever returning to
Cambodia has been made even less likely because Cambodia has no
repatriation agreement with the United States.20 2
Justice Breyer, joined by O'Connor, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg,
noted that "the Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the
United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful,
unlawful, temporary, or permanent. 20 3 In the past, indefinite civil
detention has been reserved for particularly dangerous individuals whose
mental incapacity, for example, rendered them a continuing threat to
society. In contrast, Breyer noted that deportees do not generally
impose such a threat, nor is their detention to be construed a punishment,
unlike in the criminal law context.
Next, Breyer distinguished the deportees' condition from that of a
person first entering the United States. In response to the government's
assertion that its plenary power over immigration supported its action
here, the Court held that, unlike the indefinite detention on Ellis Island
of a former United States resident in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel
Mezei,2° the indefinite detention of one who has already entered the
199. Zadvyas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 2496 (2001).
200. Id. at 2497-98.

201. Id. at 2496.
202. Id. at 2496-97 (noting district court's evidentiary finding that there was no "realistic
chance" that Ma would be returned to Cambodia in the absence of a repatriation treaty with the
United States).

203. Id. at 2500.
204. 345 U.S. 206 (1953). Mezei, a United States resident for twenty-five years, was denied

readmission into the country after leaving temporarily to visit his ailing mother in Romania. Upon
his return, he was detained on Ellis Island as excludable, ostensibly for national security reasons,
and therefore sought admission elsewhere. After he was denied entry in over a dozen countries,
Mezei advised the INS that he would no longer seek to depart. He then challenged his
confinement on Ellis Island without a hearing as a denial of due process. The district court and
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United States was subject to closer constitutional examination than the
detention and exclusion of a returning noncitizen who has technically
not entered the country.
Both Justices Scalia and Kennedy filed dissenting opinions, in
Zadvydas with Thomas joining Scalia, and Rehnquist joining Kennedy.20 5 Scalia asserted that a deportee had no constitutional right to be
paroled into the United States when she enjoyed no right to be here in
the first place:
"A criminal alien under final order of removal" who allegedly will
not be accepted by any other country in the reasonably foreseeable
future claims a constitutional right of supervised release into the
United States. This claim can be repackaged as freedom from "physical restraint" or freedom from "indefinite detention," but it is at bottom a claimed right of release into this country by an individual who
concededly has
no legal right to be here. There is no such constitu06
2

tional right.

Scalia then distinguished precedent situations involving the torture or
commitment to hard labor of a deportee, arguing that such cases have
nothing to do with the claimed right to supervised parole, which was the
issue here.2 "7 Under no circumstances, Scalia concluded, could the fedcourt of appeals granted Mezei's request for a hearing, perhaps signaling limits on Congress's
heretofore plenary power over immigration or, alternatively, as the decline of the "red scare."
In addition, these decisions renewed the hope that some constitutional individual rights
claims could survive Knauff and Harisiades. However, upon appeal to the Supreme Court, Mezei
followed precedent, and the Court overturned the lower courts' decisions. After the Court recited
the facts, its first statement was a reaffirmation of the plenary power of Congress followed by a
citation to four cases that outline Congress's traditional plenary power over immigration - Chae
Chan Ping, Fong Yue Ting, Knauff, and Harisiades: "Courts have long recognized the power to

expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's
political departments largely immune from judicial control." While acknowledging that departing
noncitizens may avail themselves of procedural due process protections, the Court appeared to
characterize Mezei not as a returning twenty-five year resident, but as "an alien on the threshold of
initial entry. As such, Knauff's deferential standard of judicial review applied to the Attorney
General's actions here: "'Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as
far as an alien denied entry is concerned.'" Despite the attempts by Justices Jackson and Black in
dissents to distinguish Knauff by emphasizing that, unlike Knauff, Mezei was actually detained at
Ellis Island and therefore deserved at least a hearing on the merits. The Court would not be
dissuaded. See Romero, On Elidn, supra note 39, at 353-54.
205. Scalia and Thomas also joined part of Kennedy's opinion in which he explained how the
clear intent of Congress was that the INS could indefinitely detain a deportee. The two justices
did not, however, agree that there might be circumstances in which a court could provide for relief
of a person detained for an unreasonable period of time. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
121 S.Ct. 2491, 2505 (2001) ("1 join Part I of JUSTICE KENNEDY's dissent, which establishes
the Attorney General's clear statutory authority to detain criminal aliens with no specified time
limit. I write separately because I do not believe that, as JUSTICE KENNEDY suggests in Part II
of his opinion, there may be some situations in which the courts can order release.").
206. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
207. id. at 2506.
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eral courts require the INS to release an individual who had been fairly
adjudged deportable according to established administrative
processes.2 °8 Mezei, the case involving the possible indefinite detention
on Ellis Island, controlled Scalia's analysis here and marked his departure from the majority's view.20 9
Kennedy's opinion took less strict a stance than Scalia's by not
21 0
ruling out the possibility of judicial intervention in some instances.
Kennedy disagreed with the majority's construction of the statute at
issue, especially its creation of a specific time period after which supervised release must be provided should deportation be no longer forthcoming. 2 1' Describing this new rule as having been "invented by the
Court," 2 12 Kennedy then moved on to uphold the statute's constitutionality, stating that a person who has substantive objections to a detention
order may challenge them in a habeas proceeding where the facts can be
fully litigated:
The Government has conceded that habeas jurisdiction is available
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to review an alien's challenge to detention
following entry of a final order of deportation, . . . although it does

not detail what the nature of the habeas review would be. As a result,
we need not decide today whether, and to what extent, a habeas court
could review the Attorney General's determination that a detained
alien continues to be dangerous or a flight risk. Given the undeniable
deprivation of liberty caused by the detention, there might be substantial questions concerning the severity necessary for there to be a
community risk; the adequacy of judicial review in specific cases
where it is alleged there is no justification for concluding an alien is
dangerous or a flight risk; and other issues. These matters are not
presented to us here.21 3
Unlike the majority, Kennedy preferred a lower court's case-by-case
analysis of a specific detention rather than a blanket subconstitutional
rule outlawing indefinite detention which Congress did not intend. Put
differently, Kennedy saw the possible constitutional issue as one involving procedural due process, which he believed was satisfied by the current safeguards even if they led to possible indefinite detention, rather
than the broader substantive due process violation that the majority
208. Id.

209. Id. at 2507 ("Because I believe Mezei controls these cases, and, like the Court, I also see
no reason to reconsider Mezei, I find no constitutional impediment to the discretion Congress gave

to the Attorney General.").
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 2508.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2517.
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hoped to avoid through a narrower reading of the INS's power under the
statute.
Like the deportees in Zadvydas and Ma, our hypothetical foreign
same-gender partner overstay would be in a similar situation of seeking
parole or deferment or supervised release. While she would concededly
have no right to be in the United States, she would claim under AADC
that she should not be subject to targeted deportation based on her sexual
orientation.
On the other hand, Zadvydas/Ma is different from our scenario
because the consequence of the government's action here is deportation,
something that the INS could not accomplish in Zadvydas/Ma. There is
no potential procedural due process violation for removing a deportable
individual because, as Justice Scalia noted, the deportee has no underlying constitutional interest in being in the United States and has received
sufficient due process through deportation proceedings.
Still, that five justices - including Justices Stevens and O'Connor
were willing to take seriously procedural due process limitations on
governmental actions vis-A-vis immigrants and nonimmigrants who have
entered the United States, and a sixth, Justice Kennedy, recognized that
judicial oversight of INS activity is alive and well, gives our hypothetical same-gender partner some hope. The question over time will be
whether Zadvydas/Ma will garner support beyond indefinite detentions
to arguably less egregious deprivations of liberty, such as the selective
deportation of same-gender partner overstays, which after all, appears to
be less of a procedural due process concern and more of an equal protection issue, along the lines discussed in Evans.
b.

INS v. St. Cyr and Calcano-Martinez v. INS: Habeas and
Direct Review

The second issue asked whether Congress had the power to retroactively deny habeas corpus (St. Cyr) and direct judicial review (CalcanoMartinez) to noncitizens whose deportation cases were pending prior to
the adoption of the 1996 immigration amendments. 14 that purportedly
curtailed such review, and who were eligible for discretionary waivers
of their deportation under old law. In the first case, Enrico St. Cyr, a
Haitian citizen, pleaded guilty to the sale of about $100 worth of
cocaine, for which he was sentenced to three years in state prison2 15 and
214. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (1996) [hereinafter ADEPA]; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 State 3009-546 (1996) [hereinafter I1RAIRA].
215. See David M. Herszenhorn, A Month After Court Victory, Immigrant is Let Out of Prison,
N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2001, at B7.
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was adjudged deportable. Under pre-1996 rules, St. Cyr was also eligible for a statutory waiver of deportation routinely given to minor offenders and upon which many relied in exchange for pleading guilty at their
criminal trial. Because deportation proceedings against him were not
commenced until after 1996, St. Cyr could not avail himself of the
waiver under the new law, the Attorney General asserted. St. Cyr filed
for habeas relief, arguing that the new law did not retroactively apply to
bar the Attorney General from granting discretionary relief. In response,
the INS contended that district courts could no longer exercise habeas
jurisdiction over deportation cases post-1996. The Court, therefore, had
to adjudicate not only whether it had jurisdiction - either directly or via
the writ of habeas corpus - to hear St. Cyr' s claim, but it also needed to
decide whether discretionary relief was still available to pre-1996 deportees. Similar issues were raised in Calcano-Martinez, except that
instead of habeas review, the INS argued that the 1996 amendments
barred direct judicial review of deportation proceedings.
Although it held in Calcano-Martinezthat Congress had the power
to retroactively revoke a noncitizen's ability to seek direct judicial
review of a deportation order, the Court simultaneously held in St. Cyr
that Congress did not unambiguously
intend to bar habeas corpus suits
2 6
on the same grounds.

While constitutional challenges to Congressional power were raised
by the parties, the Court decided both cases on statutory construction
grounds alone.217 Yet, just as in Zadvydas/Ma, the Court undergirded its
statutory analysis with a dose of constitutionalism. Citing the language
of the Suspension Clause - to wit, "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended

. .

." -

Justice Stevens, joined by Ken-

nedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, stated that to construe the 1996
code amendments to retroactively deprive noncitizens of the right to file
for habeas corpus review of their deportation proceedings would raise
serious constitutional questions. 218 Reviewing the statutory language,
Stevens would therefore not construe the statute to retroactively bar
habeas relief unless there was "specific and unambiguous"2 19 congressional intent to do so. Although it found in Calcano-Martinezthat Congress intended curtailment of direct judicial review, the Court in St. Cyr
ruled that the legislature did not intend the abolition of the writ of
216. See Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. _, 121 S.Ct. 2268, 2269 (2001); St. Cyr v. INS,
533 U.S. __, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 2293 (2001).

217. See St. Cyr, 121 S.Ct. at 2276-87; Calcano-Martinez, 121 S.Ct. at 2270 (relying primarily
on the arguments set forth in St. Cyr).
218. St. Cyr, 121 S.Ct. at 2278-79.
219. Id. at 2287.
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habeas corpus for deportees.22 ° Finding that habeas courts remained

open, the Court also ruled that the Attorney General still retained discretion whether to grant suspension of deportation, rejecting the government's assertion that such a remedy was barred by the retroactive
application of the 1996 amendments.221
Justice Scalia, writing in dissent for Rehnquist, Thomas, and in part
O'Connor, stated that the statute's "utterly clear" 222 language deprived
federal courts of jurisdiction via either habeas or direct review. Moreover, he questioned the majority's interpretation of the Suspension
Clause, arguing that both the plain meaning of the statute and controlling precedent authorize Congress's actions in this context without
offending the Constitution. The Clause forbids the "suspension" of the
writ except in cases of public emergency, while Congress here is permanently altering the writ's content in a context the Clause does not
address: whether the judiciary has the right to compel the executive to
exercise its discretion in favor of a deportable noncitizen. 223 Finally,
Scalia rejected both the petitioner's due process and Article III arguments, characterizing the deportee as one whose continued stay in the
United States is subject only to the exercise of executive grace through
the Attorney General's decision to suspend deportation. Such an act is
borne of legislative fiat, Scalia argued, and is not a constitutional
mandate.224
Justice O'Connor joined most of Scalia's opinion, parting ways
over Scalia's discussion of the Suspension Clause. Justice O'Connor
believed that, assuming its relevance to the issues here, the Clause did
not provide the substantive relief the petitioners sought - that is, a judicial mandamus requiring the Attorney General to exercise its suspension
discretion over this matter.2 25 Just as Justice Kennedy was reluctant to
issue a blanket ruling in Zadvydas/Ma, O'Connor did not want to tread
upon the legitimate power of the executive over immigration matters
without due cause.
The relevance of the St. Cyr/Calcano-Martinez to our selective
deportation hypothetical is unclear. On the one hand, the pair of cases
appear to be of even less relevance than Zadvydas/Ma because of the
lack of guidance on issues of substantive due process or equal protection-like concepts that have been examined elsewhere in this article.
220. See id. at 2276-87; Calcano-Martinez, 121 S.Ct. at 2270 (relying primarily on the
arguments set forth in St. Cyr).
221. St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2287.

222. Id. at 2293 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 2298-2302.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 2303.
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Indeed, St. Cyr/Calcano-Martinezis more procedural than Zadvydas/Ma
- the former pair relies on a constitutional norm that provides procedural due process protection - habeas relief - rather than discussing the

underlying liberty interest which partly informed the indefinite detention
holding in Zadvydas/Ma.2 6 Viewed another way, however, St. Cyr/Calcano-Martinez speaks to the underlying substantive interest in a discretionary remedy upon which the petitioners relied under prior law. But

this may not be the best reading of St. Cyr/Calcano-Martinezbecause it
would implicitly equate the hardships borne of indefinite detention in
Zadvydas/Ma with the theoretically less determinate evils visited upon
one denied suspension of deportation. Put differently, a person who is

indefinitely detained suffers a greater deprivation of liberty than one
denied suspension of deportation, since the latter is not incarcerated or

detained, but only sent to another country.
Perhaps most confusing are the differences in votes by Justices

Kennedy and O'Connor. In Zadvydas/Ma, O'Connor voted with the
pro-noncitizen majority, but voted against them in St. Cyr/Calcano-Martinez. Kennedy's votes were the inverse of O'Connor's: he sided with
the dissent in Zadvydas/Ma, but with the majority in St. Cyr/Calcano-

Martinez. Evident from their opinions in these cases is Kennedy's and
O'Connor's concern that the Court not overstep its bounds in the area of
immigration policy. In Zadvydas/Ma, Kennedy questioned the Court's
decision to effectively rewrite Congress's detention statute by creating a
"reasonableness" requirement that does not appear anywhere in the text.
Similarly, in St. Cyr/Calcano-Martinez, O'Connor refused to force the
Attorney General to exercise his discretion in ruling upon whether to

suspend deportable noncitizens.
In both cases, these two justices agreed with the canon that requires
that statutes be construed so as to avoid constitutional doubt, yet they
226. "Freedom from imprisonment-from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint-lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects." Zadvydas v. INS, 533 U.S.
678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 2498 (2001). Justice Breyer goes on to add that this substantive freedom is
protected by proper procedural safeguards: "And this Court has said that government detention
violates that Clause unless the detention is ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate
procedural protections." See id. While Justice Kennedy's dissent did not disagree that the due
process clause contains both a substantive and procedural element to it, he opined that in this case,
only the question of procedure was at issue. See id. at 2515 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Whether a due process right is denied when removable aliens who are flight risks or
dangers to the community are detained turns, then, not on the substantive right to be
free, but on whether there are adequate procedures to review their cases, allowing
persons once subject to detention to show that through rehabilitation, new
appreciation of their responsibilities, or under other standards, they no longer
present special risks or danger if put at large. The procedures to determine and to
review the status-required detention go far toward this objective.
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could not agree as to how this rule was to be applied. They also agreed
that the Court should cautiously guard against invading upon the province of the political branches' authority over immigration matters. A
similar "agreement over the law but disagreement over its application"
explains Kennedy's and O'Connor's split in Nguyen after they had filed
27
a joint opinion in Miller."
In predicting what these recent subconstitutional cases might mean for their votes on our same-gender partner overstay hypothetical is unclear, although it would be safe to say that these
two justices have no particularly strong leanings either pro- or antiimmigrant with respect to the close cases in Zadvydas/Ma and St. Cyri
Calcano-Martinez.
Thus, both Kennedy and O'Connor will likely pay close attention
to the particular facts and law brought before the Court on our hypothetical same-gender partner's selective deportation claim. Should both Kennedy and O'Connor believe that the INS is engaging in outrageous
conduct by specifically targeting homosexuals in the same way that Colorado's Amendment 2 did in Evans, our fictional same-gender partner
overstay will likely get these two justices' approval to the extent that
their votes in Nguyen and Zadvydas/Ma affirm that the immigration
code, and thus enforcement pursuant to it, are not immune from equal
protection or due process review, respectively.
But whether something is "outrageous" is a question of degree.
Should either Kennedy or O'Connor believe, like Scalia consistently
asserts, that deportees do not have a constitutional right to be in the
United States, that the Court should generally refrain from secondguessing the political branches, and that the hardship visited upon the
same-gender overstay - unlike indefinite detention or retroactive denial
of habeas - is not particularly serious, 228 then one or both of these
justices might rule against our same-gender partner overstay.
227. See supra notes 170-81, 193, and accompanying text.
228. Outside of the cases mentioned here, other sources suggest that Kennedy and O'Connor
might not consider the deportation of an overstay a particularly vexatious consequence. In INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984), Justice O'Connor took care to describe a

deportation hearing as a "purely civil action" and not a criminal one, thereby following
longstanding precedent describing deportation as not punitive in nature. In Sullivan v. INS, 772
F.2d 609, 611 (9th Cir. 1985), in upholding the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) decision
that a same-gender partner's deportation would not constitute "extreme hardship" to his United
States citizen partner, then-Circuit Judge Kennedy noted that:
Deportation rarely occurs without personal distress and emotional hurt. Various
courts have previously upheld orders of the BIA that resulted in the separation of
aliens from members of their families, or placed aliens in war-tom countries in
which life can be deemed harsh, if not brutal. Against this background, the
individual application before us does not demonstrate that the BIA abused its

discretion.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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Then there is Justice Stevens. Despite his apparent deference to
Congress and the INS in Miller/Nguyen and AADC, Stevens votes solidly in favor of the noncitizen in both Zadvydas/Ma and St. Cyr/Calcano-Martinez, penning the majority opinions in the latter set of cases.
While these subconstitutional decisions appear to more strongly protect
the rights of noncitizens than the constitutional immigration decisions
discussed earlier, Stevens's voting record belies an overall concern for
the underdog. Combining these immigration decisions with his even
stronger positions and rhetoric in the gay rights cases - specifically
Hardwick and Dale - suggests that he would vote in favor of the samegender partner overstay, especially if he considers Miller and Nguyen as
being cases about burdening males rather than females.
The rest of the justices will probably line up along the lines already
discussed: Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas against the same-gender partner overstay; Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter for the individual.
These particular justices' opinions aside, the next section explores
what a Court's opinion might look like should it choose to favor our
hypothetical plaintiff, on the one hand, or rule in favor of the government, on the other. It concludes that, on balance, the selective deportation of same-gender partner overstays should constitute an "outrageous"
case under the AADC test.
D.

Why the Selective Deportation of Same-Gender Partner
Overstays Should Constitute the "Rara Avis"

The "outrageous" test articulated by Scalia in AADC appears to be
another version of the "minimal protection" test that has led to the protection of individual rights in both the gay rights and immigrants' rights
cases. In Evans, the Court applied what appeared to be a heightened
scrutiny test masquerading as rational basis to prevent particularly invidious sexual orientation discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause.2 2 9 In Zadvydas/Ma and St. Cyr/Calcano-Martinez,the specters
of due process and the Suspension Clause were invoked as limits on the
statutory interpretation of immigration laws that could otherwise excessively curtail noncitizens' rights.
However, the cases in which the Court chose to protect the homosexual or the noncitizen stand in contrast to the majority of the cases
reviewed in which the Court deferred to majoritarian sentiment against
gays and noncitizens because it believed these groups sought special
rights rather than minimum equal treatment. In Hardwick, the Court
narrowly characterized the case as a claim for a special right to engage
229. Romers v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996).
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in homosexual sodomy rather than as a broader right of privacy to deny
protection under the disfavored substantive due process doctrine. Similarly, the Miller/Nguyen and AADC Courts chose not to interfere in the
executive and legislative branches' decisions over immigration matters,
even though in Nguyen the Court purported to apply heightened scrutiny
to the challenged legislation. Finally, in Hurley and Dale, the Court
refused to give credence to the dictates of a single state's law over the
national constitutional rights owing to private groups who choose to discriminate against homosexuals.
Thus, the Court will strike down legislative or executive action
only if a majority believes two elements are fulfilled: (1) the plaintiff has
been unfairly deprived of a right open to all and asks only for "equal," as
opposed to "special," treatment; and (2) there is no legitimate governmental interest in protecting the will of the majority of the people
opposed to providing equal treatment, either through legislative policy,
executive action, or the expression of a core constitutional value.
1.

EQUAL, BUT NOT SPECIAL, RIGHTS

To make her case, the same-gender partner overstay will, like the
plaintiffs in Evans, need to convince the Court that her selective deportation is particularly egregious - indeed, "outrageous" - and not the
product of some rational distinction between homosexuals and other
deportees. Though not constitutional decisions, Zadvydas/Ma and St.
Cyr/Calcano-Martinezmight provide her with analogous facts, urging
the Court to broaden its protection of nonimmigrants currently in the
United States so that they are treated like all other deportees whose sexual orientation conforms to societal norms.2 3 °
The decision to deport same-gender partner overstays simply
because they are homosexual has the same sweeping, irrational quality
to it that Amendment 2 had in Evans. While concededly more narrow in
its scope because a deportation order affects the noncitizen homosexuals' immigration status only, for the noncitizen, the barrier erected by
that decision is arguably as insurmountable as the virtual dilution of voting power created by the Coloradans. Indeed, because the INS's policy
would be of national scope, it would have a far more widespread impact
on gays and lesbians than a single state's discriminatory act. Thus, a
230. Hurley and Dale might provide a substantive basis for asserting a First Amendment right
to "expressively associate" by entering a civil union that would be substantially interfered with by
the deportation of one of the foreign partners. Of course, the response would be that first, the
Vermont civil union is not sufficiently analogous to the parade in Hurley or the Boy Scouts
organization to constitute an "expressive association." And further, even if it were, the INS's
decision to deport would have a minimal effect on the association because the couple could
choose to live outside of the United States.
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class action claim would be the best vehicle for a frontal assault on such
a policy.
To prove that theirs is an "equal rights" (and not "special rights")
claim, our hypothetical class action plaintiffs should: (1) present specific
evidence of homophobic conduct by the INS; (2) show that they are
productive members of society; (3) emphasize that they seek no change
in existing law, but only that their deportability be considered separate
and apart from their sexual orientation; and (4) draw analogies to the
Court's most recent decisions in Zadvydas/Ma and St. Cyr/CalcanoMartinez, arguing that extreme unfairness may not be visited upon even
non-United States citizens.
To bolster the analogy, persuasive evidence will first need to be
gathered to demonstrate the animus required by Evans. A written formal
or informal policy of deporting same-gender partners supported by documentary evidence of invidious discrimination would provide the best
case. A good example would be the INS letter Adams v. Howerton 3 1
plaintiffs Richard Adams and Tony Sullivan received regarding their
request that Mr. Sullivan, an Australian, be classified as Mr. Adams's
spouse:
Upon consideration, it is ordered that your visa petition filed on April
28, 1975 for classification of Anthony Corbett Sullivan as the spouse
of a United States citizen be denied for the following reasons:
You have failed to establish that a bona fide marital relationship
can exist between two faggots.2 32
Second, evidence that the INS generally does not deport productive, out-of-status, noncitizens would likewise suggest animus. Last
year, the New York Times reported that the INS does not even bother
deporting undocumented immigrants anymore, only those who it later
discover have criminal records. 233 Because of the then-booming United
States economy and these undocumented immigrants' willingness to do
work no United States workers would perform, the INS concentrated its
deportation efforts elsewhere, targeting mostly those with criminal
records.2 34 If our hypothetical overstays demonstrated their contributions to the general welfare through employment, the payment of taxes,
caring for adopted children, volunteer work, or other productive activities, then the INS's policy of selectively choosing them for deportation
becomes even more suspect, especially in light of current INS
231. See Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982); see also supra notes 1-6 and
accompanying text.
232. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 157 (3d ed. 2002).

233. Louis Uchitelle, I.N.S. Is Looking The Other Way As Illegal Immigrants Fill Jobs:
Enforcement Changes in Face of Labor Shortage, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2000, at Al.
234. Id.
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prosecutorial discretion guidelines." 5
A third point, crucial to the deportees' claim, would be to assert
that they are not looking to have the law changed to promote homosexuality. As discussed above, their argument asks only that they be treated
as any heterosexual overstays, without consideration of their homosexual relationships. They should avoid the Hardwick trap by not claiming
a special right to which gays should be entitled. Relying instead on the
Evans analysis, strong evidence of animus, and a vow not to change
existing law, our fictional deportees could provide the Court with a firm
doctrinal basis for finding the selective deportation constitutionally "outrageous" under AADC.
Fourth and finally, analogies should be made to the deprivations of
rights discussed in Zadvydas/Ma and St. Cyr/Calcano-Martinez. Read
broadly, these two pairs of cases stand for the proposition that a minimum level of protection afforded noncitizens exists regardless of Congress's plenary power over immigration and the INS's Chevron power to
enforce the law. Just as the government may not indefinitely detain or
retroactively deny habeas relief to noncitizens, neither may it rely on
sexual orientation as a basis for prioritizing deportability.
In response, the government might characterize the selective deportation argument as a claim for special treatment by a non-suspect class,
relying on Nguyen and Hardwick by drawing distinctions between
homosexuals and heterosexuals. It might also argue that Evans,
Zadvydas/Ma, and St. Cyr/Calcano-Martinezshould be read narrowly to
apply only to extreme deprivations of liberty and due process. As will
be shown below, such arguments fail to persuade because they offend
our common sense of justice and fair play.
First, the government might look to Nguyen and Hardwick for guidance, not so much doctrinally as thematically. In Nguyen, the Court
applied an intermediate scrutiny test in a most deferential way, finding
that the actual differences between men and women supported Congress's gender-based citizenship statute. Thus, the Court concluded that
the statute's distinctions were not rooted in invidious stereotyping. Similarly, the INS may argue that its decision to deport same-gender partner
overstays may be based on rational bases and not homophobic animus or
stereotypes. To the extent Congress's decision to pass the Defense of
Marriage Act stemmed from a desire to preserve the traditional institution of heterosexual marriage and not to condemn homosexuality, the
INS would contend that its decision to deport same-gender partner overstays simply enforces that national policy. Like the father in Nguyen,
235. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
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the hypothetical overstay is not entitled to special treatment but, rather is
subject to differential treatment based on her different sexual orientation,
which provides her no unique protection under the law, as even the
Evans majority acknowledged.2 36
In Hardwick, the Court upheld selective enforcement of anti-sodomy laws against homosexuals because it found no substantive due process right to engage in same-gender sodomy. Here, the government may
assert that same-gender partner overstays probably engage in homosexual conduct and are not to be provided special constitutional protection
for their acts. Thus, the INS's policy to selectively deport same-gender
partner overstays may be justified on Hardwick grounds: Because some
states still prohibit homosexual sodomy, the INS is within its rights to
deport someone who could have been prosecuted for a crime of moral
turpitude. 237 To the extent that the INS has consistently prioritized the
deportation of criminals, it might argue that the decision to deport samegender partner overstays is a permissible proxy for criminal conduct.
After all, the Court in AADC presumed that the INS would act constitutionally and would only invalidate its action if it acted "outrageously."
If, under Hardwick, homosexual sodomy may be criminalized and,
indeed, it remains a crime in some jurisdictions, and if criminal sexual
conduct can constitute a deportable offense, then surely the selective
deportation of a same-gender partner overstay is not unreasonable, even
if it is based on one's status.
While the above arguments from Nguyen and Hardwick appear
doctrinally sound, they fail the "common sense" test. Nguyen did not
involve the specific targeting of a disadvantaged group because of their
status; rather, it acknowledged the reality that males in the armed services should be held responsible for their foreign-born, out-of-wedlock
offspring, a responsibility that is borne solely by the noncitizen mother.
Homosexuals deported en masse because of their same-gender relationships suffer a much greater disability than United States citizen fathers,
both within immigration law and in society generally. Put another way,
homosexuals of both genders fit the description of a "discrete and insular minority" more closely than heterosexual males in the armed services
and therefore deserve more protection.
Moreover, in Hardwick, the Court's real concern was actual homosexual conduct, not status. While engaging in a civil union may techni236. See also Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001) (noting

that even though federal law forbids it, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause does
not prohibit discrimination against disabled persons); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S.

62, 84 (2000) (noting that the Equal Protection Clause does not forbid age discrimination).
237. See INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2001) (stating that a moral

turpitude crime is a deportable offense).
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cally be an "act," to deport homosexuals en masse because they seek
state recognition of their relationships appears as draconian as removing

all black, male, noncitizens because they dared to marry white, female,
citizens. As a practical matter, it would be difficult to imagine the INS
drawing the "act/status" distinction given that it believes that foreign
homosexuals persecuted based solely on their sexual orientation are eligible for asylum in the United States.2 38
Even if the Court found the themes in Nguyen and Hardwick inap-

posite and Evans more appropriate, the INS might contend that the deprivation of immigration benefits does not confer upon the same-gender
partner overstay as broad-based a disability as Amendment 2 envisioned.
Just as the noncitizen in Nguyen had available several different ways of

establishing citizenship despite having a United States citizen father, 39
the same-gender partner overstay need not rely on her United States citi-

zen partner to remain in the United States. Indeed, both employment

40
and diversity visas are avenues open to all prospective immigrants,2
same-gender partners included.2 4 '
As argued earlier, however, mass selective deportation based on
sexual orientation has the potential to affect a greater number of homo-

sexuals than Colorado's Amendment 2, which would have applied only
238. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 232 at 926 n.5. See also Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. &
N. Dec. 819 (BIA 1990) (upholding withholding of deportation to homosexual persecuted in Cuba
based on sexual orientation).
239. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 121 S.Ct. 2053, 2064-65 (2001).
In analyzing § 1409(a)(4), we are mindful that the obligation it imposes with respect
to the acquisition of citizenship by the child of a citizen father is minimal. This
circumstance shows that Congress has not erected inordinate and unnecessary
hurdles to the conferral of citizenship on the children of citizen fathers in furthering
its important objectives. Only the least onerous of the three options provided for in
§ 1409(a)(4) must be satisfied. If the child has been legitimated under the law of the
relevant jurisdiction, that will be the end of the matter. See § 1409(a)(4)(A). In the
alternative, a father who has not legitimated his child by formal means need only
make a written acknowledgement of paternity under oath in order to transmit
citizenship to his child, hardly a substantial burden. See § 1409(a)(4)(B). Or, the
father could choose to obtain a court order of paternity. See § 1409(a)(4)(C)....
Section 1409(a), moreover, is not the sole means by which the child of a citizen
father can attain citizenship. An individual who fails to comply with § 1409(a), but
who has substantial ties to the United States, can seek citizenship in his or her own
right, rather than via reliance on ties to a citizen parent. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1423,
1427.
Id.

240. See INA § 201(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a)(2) (2001) (provision allowing for employmentbased immigration); INA § 201(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a)(3) (2001) (provision allowing for
diversity-based immigration).
241. Indeed, Pradeep Singla, Program Associate at the Lesbian and Gay Immigration Rights
Task Force, shared with me that he was aware "of one binational couple in Vermont where the
foreign partner was about to fall out of status after his student visa expired. He, however, was
able to obtain an H-lB [temporary work] visa." E-mail from Pradeep Singla, supra note 18.
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to state residents. In addition, the availability of other avenues for
remaining in the United States does not legitimize a homophobic deportation policy. An analogy to interracial marriages might clarify this
point. Because a black noncitizen can immigrate to the United States by
obtaining either an employment or diversity visa does not justify denying him the opportunity to obtain a family-based visa because he
chooses to marry a white United States citizen. In our hypothetical, the
same-gender deportee does not even go that far. She does not ask that
the immigration code be changed to allow for same-gender immigration
benefits; she wants only to be treated as any heterosexual overstay.
Finally, the INS might argue that any analogies to the Zadvydas/Ma
and St. Cyr/Calcano-Martinezcases are unconvincing. It could describe
the indefinite detention and retroactive application of the law as more
extreme abuses of governmental power than the decision to deport an
admittedly removable noncitizen, albeit one who was selectively chosen.
While these two sets of cases do focus on arguably more extreme
deprivations of due process, there is no principled reason to limit
Zadvydas/Ma and St. Cyr/Calcano-Martinezto their specific facts. That
Zadvydas and St. Cyr suffered significant hardship does not mean that
same-gender partner overstays selectively chosen for mass deportation
would not. Selectively choosing someone to be deported because that
person is gay offends our sensibilities much in the same way that indefinite detention and the retroactive denial of habeas relief do. All three
governmental acts are abuses of power that the Court should not tolerate.
On balance, despite the government's best efforts to ground its
defense of a sexual orientation-based selective deportation policy in doctrine and traditional values, 2 4 2 our hypothetical same-gender partner

overstay's claim sounds more in equal rights than special rights when
basic fairness is considered. Selective targeting of homosexuals for
deportation based solely on their status alone imposes upon an already
vilified class a sweeping disability, not unlike discrimination based on
race or gender.

242. "The endowment effect suggests that, ceteris paribus, people feel more invested in rules

that have long been in place, and so a long history of a particular policy will help protect it against
constitutional challenge. This helps explain the robustness of marriage's discrimination against
same-gender couples and the military's exclusion of [Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transgendered]
people, both longstanding policies." Eskridge, supra note 29, at 1388. The debate within
religious communities has, not surprisingly, spawned much literature. See, e.g., DAVID L. BALICH,
HOMOSEXUALITY, SCIENCE, AND THE "PLAIN SENSE" OF SCRIPTURE (2000); CHOON-LEONG SEOW,
HOMOSEXUALITY AND CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY
CHURCH:

BOTH

SIDES OF THE DEBATE

(1994).

(1996);

JEFFREY S. SIKER, HOMOSEXUALITY IN THE
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NO COUNTERVAILING FEDERAL OR CONSTITUTIONAL INTEREST IN
SELECTIVE DEPORTATION OF SAME-GENDER
PARTNER OVERSTAYS

Even if it accepts the view that our same-gender partner overstay
seeks only equal and not special treatment, the Court will still inquire
whether there is a legitimate countervailing governmental interest to preserve majoritarian anti-gay and anti-immigrant outcomes through legislative fiat, executive action, or constitutional imperative. Despite that
the majority of the cases reviewed here suggest that the Court usually
defers to anti-gay and anti-immigrant legislative or executive action, the
following discussion demonstrates that there is no legitimate reason for
the Court to support the selective deportation of foreign same-gender
partner overstays.
Evans, Zadvydas/Ma, and St. Cyr/Calcano-Martinez all suggest
that, while it is often reluctant to do so, the Court will intervene to elevate the rights of gays and noncitizens if there is no good countervailing
reason to do otherwise. In Evans, the Court concluded that the very
essence of equal protection was the requirement that all have access to
the political process, something denied homosexuals for no other reason
than their sexual orientation. In Zadvydas/Ma, indefinite detention was
adjudged too punitive a consequence that would deprive due process
rights even to those individuals adjudged deportable. In St. Cyr/Calcano-Martinez, the Court found that retroactive denial of the writ of
habeas corpus crossed the citizen-noncitizen divide in a way that failed
to provide even minimal protection for this already disadvantaged group.
Analogously, the Court might find that the government has no rational
reason for deporting same-gender overstays based solely on their sexual
orientation and that they should be considered for deportation or deferral
like any other group.
But despite this line of precedent, the Court may submit to the
expertise of federal executive and legislature decisionmakers or may
seek to preserve a constitutional core value. Regardless of the motive
behind the Court's action, the result would nonetheless sustain discrimination against gays and lesbians. Thus, the Miller/Nguyen and AADC
courts chose not to interfere in the executive and legislative branches'
decisions over immigration matters, even though in Nguyen the Court
purported to apply heightened scrutiny to the challenged legislation.
The Court appears to trust the relative expertise of the political branches
on immigration and nationality issues, giving credence to the proffered
reasons for the government's action. In AADC, for instance, the Court
was unwilling to intervene despite the assertion of a First Amendment
right on the part of the deportable noncitizens for fear of diminishing the
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political branches' power to combat international terrorism. And in
Nguyen, the Court was reluctant to strike down a gender distinction that
could effectively lead to the conferral of automatic citizenship to numbers greater than those contemplated by Congress. Finally, in Hurley
and Dale, the Court refused to give credence to the dictates of a single
state's law over the federal constitutional rights owing to private groups
who choose to discriminate against homosexuals.
Yet, unlike in Nguyen, AADC, or Hurley/Dale, there is no valid
reason to defer to Congress should it decide to single out same-gender
partner overstays for deportation. Unlike in Nguyen or AADC, there is
no threat of unduly interfering with the legislature's or executive's
power over immigration since the remedy sought by the deportee is that
the decision to deport her first be examined without regard to her sexual
orientation. Should the INS still decide she should be deported, it may
do so.243 Furthermore, unlike fears of the automatic conferral of citizenship in Nguyen or the promotion of terrorism in AADC, asking the INS
to reconsider its deportation decision free of sexual orientation bias carries no similar negative consequence for immigration policy. Lastly,
unlike in Hurley or Dale, no private party has a vested interest in
preventing the same-gender partner overstay from asserting a right to
equal treatment. While Congress has passed the Defense of Marriage
Act to limit the federal rights of same-gender couples, our protagonist
does not seek to be accorded marriage benefits in a way analogous to
Dale wanting to be part of the Boy Scouts. The same-gender partner
overstay seeks only to be treated like any other overstay, and the government has no apparently good reason to do otherwise.
III.

CONCLUSION

United States citizen Richard Adams and Australian national Tony
Sullivan were married by a Boulder city clerk in Colorado in 1975, hoping to be able to reside permanently in the United States just as any
heterosexual binational couple.2 44 Because the Ninth Circuit construed
243. Of course, the next issue becomes the fabrication of reasons to avoid the charge of sexual
orientation discrimination, which is analogous to the difficulty in Batson proceedings, for
instance. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Purkett v. Elm, 514 U.S. 765 (1995). On
the difficulties posed by a Batson analysis, see Eric Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox:
Harmless Error,Jury Representation, and the Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93 (1996). Thus,
a smart INS lawyer may be able to come up with a sexual orientation-neutral reason for deporting
a homosexual. However, the INS lawyer will be hard pressed to come up with a valid reason
given the agency's policy that it has decided not to be specifically concerned about undocumented
persons, which presumably extends to overstays as well. See supra text accompanying notes 22829.
244. See Lesbian and Gay Immigration Rights Task Force, Anthony Sullivan & Richard
Adams, Plaintiffs in 1982 Case Against INS, Celebrate 25th Anniversary, TASK FORCE UPDATE
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the INA term "spouse" to refer to those involved in heterosexual marriages only24 5 and denied Sullivan's claims of hardship should he be
deported, 4 6 however, Sullivan has been forced to live in the United
States as a fugitive from the INS so that he can be with Adam.247
The deported foreigner is not the only person affected; the United
States citizen partner is likewise harmed. For instance, one United
States citizen in another binational relationship expressed sadness about
being effectively "forced to leave his own country because of his own

government's discriminatory laws."2'48 This couple has moved to
Canada where gays and lesbians are more protected under the law.24 9
Aside from Canada, eleven other nations also provide immigration
Indeed, one of the eleven recently
benefits to same-gender partners.2
took the next step in moving towards parity for homosexual relationships. As of April 1, 2001, all same-gender marriages performed in the
Netherlands would have the same force and effect as traditional hetero-

sexual marriages.251
(Fall 1996), available at http://www.lgirtf.org/newsletters/FaII96/FA96-12.html (last visited on
June 22, 2001).
245. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 1982). See supra notes 1-6 and
accompanying text.
246. Sullivan v. INS, 772 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1985). Interestingly, then-Circuit Judge Kennedy
wrote the opinion for the Ninth Circuit upholding the Board of Immigration Appeals' finding that
Sullivan would suffer no undue hardship:
Deportation rarely occurs without personal distress and emotional hurt. Various
courts have previously upheld orders of the BIA that resulted in the separation of
aliens from members of their families, or placed aliens in war-tom countries in
which life can be deemed harsh, if not brutal. Against this background, the
individual application before us does not demonstrate that the BIA abused its
discretion. The Board considered the petitioner's individual claims on their merits
and acted within its authority in denying the application.
Id. at 611 (citations omitted).
247. See JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS V. THE
SUPREME COURT 4 (2001) ("Australian Tony Sullivan lives illegally in the United States because
the [Supreme Court] refused to help him remain with the American man he has loved for over a
quarter century."). Returning to Australia was not an option for the couple because Adam had
only been granted a temporary visa. Id. at 224.
248. See Lesbian and Gay Immigration Rights Task Force, "Oh Canada, Glorious and Free":
French/American Binational Couple Immigrates to Begin New Life Together, TASK FORCE
UPDATE (Winter 1997), available at http://www.lgirtf.org/newsletters/Winter97/W6.html (last
visited June 24, 2001).
249. Id.
250. The eleven countries that currently provide immigration benefits to same-gender partners
are: Australia; Belgium; Canada; Denmark; France; Iceland; Netherlands; Norway; South Africa;
Sweden; New Zealand; and the United Kingdom. See Christopher A. Duenas, Note, Coming to
America: The Immigration Obstacle Facing Binational Same-Sex Couples, 73 S. CAL. L. REV.
811, 813 n.8 (2000).
251. See David Orgon Coolidge & William C. Duncan, Reaffirming Marriage:A Presidential
Priority, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 623, 632-33 (2001) (describing new Dutch same-gender
marriage law).
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Two commentators predict that at some point, an American citizen
will marry a Dutch citizen in a same-gender ceremony in the Netherlands and then seek recognition of that union in the United States. 52
While this scenario implicates more than the conferral of immigration
benefits, it presents a problem that will likely require governmental
attention at some point in the not-too-distant future. In an effort to
resolve this complex issue, many others have argued for the extension of
immigration benefits to same-gender couples2 53 or the legalization of
gay marriages. 254
This Article has a much less ambitious agenda: it seeks only to
explore the possibility that the selective deportation of a same-gender

partner who has overstayed her visa constitutes an outrageous case under
the AADC test. Its modest goal is to discourage the INS from ever pur-

suing such a strategy, knowing that there are probably many who believe
that same-gender partner overstays, even if civilly united in Vermont,
are not the ideal candidates for "suspect class" status under our constitutional law. 2 55 That notwithstanding, common sense and sound doctrine
252. Id. at 633.
253. See, e.g., Duenas, supra note 250; Brian McGloin, Comment, Diverse Families with
Parallel Needs: A Proposalfor Same-Sex Immigration Benefits, 30 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 159
(1999); Cynthia M. Reed, When Love, Comity, and Justice Conquer Borders: INS Recognition of
Same-Sex Marriage,28 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 97 (1996); Amy R. Brownstein, Note,
Why Same-Sex Spouses Should Be GrantedPreferentialImmigration Status: Reevaluating Adams
v. Howerton, 16 Lov. L.A. IN'r'L & COMP. L.J. 763 (1994).
254. See, e.g., Koppelman, supra note 11; Jill R. Green, Comment, Will the Marriageof Dick
and Jane Evolve into the Marriageof Jane and Jane? Same-Sex Marriage:A Viable Union in the
21st Century, 45 Loy. L. REV. 313 (1999); Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and
Legislative Incentives to Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745 (1995); Barbara
J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We Still Married
When We Return Home?, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 1033 (1994); John G. Culhane, Uprooting the
Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1119 (1999); Larry Catd Backer,
Constructing a "Homosexual" for Constitutional Theory: Sodomy Narrative, Jurisprudence,and
Antipathy in United States and British Courts, 71 TUL. L. REV. 529 (1996); Lynn D. Wardle, A
CriticalAnalysis of ConstitutionalClaimsfor Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1996).
255. Of course, the real way to test whether the INS would implement a policy of selective
same-gender deportation would be to encourage several noncitizen partners in a same-gender
union to deliberately overstay, thus forcing the INS's hand by setting up a possible class action
test case - admittedly, a tricky proposition given the lack of case law post-AADC. At that point,
the INS would have to decide whether to begin deporting such individuals, as it did in AADC, or
to grant deferrals. Although e-mails I have received from several gay/lesbian advocacy groups
suggest that same-gender immigration benefits are a major concern, no one has reported to me any
case in which the INS has decided to selectively target an overstaying noncitizen partner for
deportation. See E-mail from Pradeep Singla, supra note 18 ("Regarding your question about a
foreign partner facing removal, I am not aware of any couple whose relationship has been certified
in Vermont where the foreign partner is in removal proceedings."); E-mail from Carol Wolchok,
American Bar Association, to Victor Romero, Penn State-Dickinson School of Law (May 17,
2001) (on file with author) ("Interesting question. I am not aware of recent cases ....
). That
said, I could well imagine some renegade INS branch doing this as an informal policy, as Adams
and Sullivan's "two faggots" letter from the agency makes plain. See supra note 227 and
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suggest that, despite the many anti-gay and anti-immigrant decisions
handed down over the last twenty years, the Court will not hesitate to
halt egregious government conduct when the plaintiff is being deprived
of equal rights and there is no legitimate countervailing reason to justify
the discrimination. In the hypothetical mass deportation of same-gender
partner overstays, this Article applies such an approach while breathing
life into the as-yet-undefined "outrageous" exception test created by the
256
AADC Court.

accompanying text. But aside from whether there evolves an anti-gay deportation policy, as a
theoretical matter, the selective sexual orientation deportation hypothetical raises awareness of an
issue of much concern to the gay/lesbian community (and, I believe, should be of equal concern to
the general public) and tests the limits of the AADC test. Based on an analysis of the cases, it is
unclear whether at this point in time such selective deportation would be considered "outrageous."
My hope, however, is that by mining the arguments pro and con, I have provided enough of a
disincentive to the INS to ever consider the adoption of such a policy.
256. Despite its vagueness, the AADC "outrageous" test may develop into a useful tool for
lower courts to ferret out extreme cases of selective deportation, such as the one described here.
In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050-51 (1984), for example, the Court stated that the
exclusionary rule could apply to "egregious" constitutional violations, without further explanation.
Since then, the Ninth Circuit has issued two decisions, outlawing the INS's sole reliance on racial
appearance (Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1994)) or a foreign-sounding name
(Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488 (9th Cir. 1994)) as proxies for alienage. See also Jonathan L.
Hafetz, Note and Comment, The Rule of Egregiousness: INS v. Lopez-Mendoza Reconsidered, 19
WHrrIER

L.

REV.

843 (1998).

